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ABSTRACT 
 
Medicare in Canada is a federally and provincially funded public service. The federal 
government provides financial assistance to the provinces for Medicare through the Canada 
Health Transfer (CHT), which, along with the other federal transfers (Canada Social Transfer 
and Equalization), intends to correct the country’s vertical fiscal gap. The federal government 
has an important role in Medicare, which is to work with the provinces to ensure all Canadians 
have access to Medicare and to ensure a national standard of Medicare (Government of Canada 
1982; Senate 2002).  
In 2014, the federal government unilaterally amended the CHT formula to an equal-per-
capita distribution. This change means the provinces receive their CHT portion based exclusively 
on their percentage of the national population. The change makes it more difficult for some 
provincial governments to provide comparable levels of Medicare services because of their 
relatively lower fiscal capacity and higher medical needs of their populations. A potential way to 
recognize the inherent differences between provinces and territories is to allocate the CHT based 
on need. Compared with the simple equal-per-capita allocation, a needs-based formula (NBF) is 
a fairer allocation of finite resources based on distribution of health needs, but it presents a 
number of problems. Distributing resources based on need may create inefficiencies or lack 
transparency because a more complex formula may create unintended consequences, resulting in 
moral hazards and perverse incentives (a perverse incentive is the negative result of an otherwise 
good intension). A needs-based CHT formula is likely to succeed only when it properly balances 
equity, efficiency, and transparency criteria.  
An equitable, efficient, and transparent formula composition can help an NBF succeed in 
upholding a national standard, but whether an NBF is feasible depends on the institutional, fiscal, 
and political context of Canada. Policy makers interested in designing an NBF can look to other 
countries that use an NBF. However, current literature focuses on formula composition and fails 
to explain why countries have differing formulas. This study first attempts to fill the gap in the 
literature by proposing a framework to develop an NBF. Second, the study uses a comparative 
analysis to understand the historical context of Canada and Australia in developing their 
respective federal health-transfer programs. Through these analyses, this study aims to answer 
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one question: is it possible to implement a needs-based formula for CHT that is equitable but 
also minimizes perverse incentives?  
This study finds that an ideal NBF formula for CHT that meets the criteria of equity, 
efficiency, and transparency should include age structure, sex, and location of populations.  
Through the comparative study of Australia and Canada, the study finds that it is possible to 
implement an NBF formula that considers age structure, sex, and location of populations. 
However, feasibility of such an NBF in Canada is dependent on establishing a collaborative 
relationship between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments. In spite of the 
decentralized fiscal power and regional divides in Canada, it is possible for the governments to 
collaborate given the strong national support for the Medicare system. Canadians value their 
Medicare system, which they see as a supranational program that transcends regional interests, 
and desire to see their governments work together to ensure equitable access to Medicare 
services. To meet the expectations of Canadians and safeguard Medicare, the federal and 
provincial governments could adopt the Australian approach and collaborate through a formal 
body like the Commonwealth Grants Commission or the Council of Australian Governments. By 
working together through these formal bodies, there is a chance that Canada could adopt an NBF 
for the CHT, secure a national standard of Medicare, and support the values Canadians have for 
their Medicare system.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicare in Canada is constitutionally a provincial jurisdiction. However, Canadians view 
Medicare as a right of citizenship. Medicare is an integral part of Canadian identity. To be a 
Canadian is to have equitable access to Medicare regardless of ability to pay or location.1   
To ensure a national standard in Medicare, the federal government transfers the Canada 
Health Transfer (CHT) to the provinces and territories to support them in providing Medicare 
services. The constitution supports the federal government’s involvement in Medicare. Section 
36(1) c of the constitution specifies that the federal government and the provincial governments 
commit to providing Canadians with essential public services of reasonable quality (Government 
of Canada 1982). Although there has been no legal interpretation of Section 36(1) c specifying 
Medicare as an essential public service, Canadians consistently view access to Medicare as 
integral to their citizenship (Romanow 2002; Dufresne et al. 2014).  
Through the CHT, the federal government attempts to uphold a national standard of 
Medicare services (Boadway 2004). To incentivize the provinces to maintain a universally 
provided public Medicare system, the federal government attaches conditions to the CHT.  
Provinces are eligible to receive the CHT if they abide by the five principles of the Canada 
Health Act (CHA): public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and 
accessibility. Public administration means that non-profit public officials must administer 
insured health-care services (i.e. services provided by physicians and hospitals). 
Comprehensiveness means Medicare insures all medically necessary services. Universality 
means all insured residents of Canada are entitled to the same standard of health-care. Portability 
means insured Canadians who move to a new province, territory or out of the country are entitled 
to coverage of their home province or territory for a set period (i.e. three months). Finally, 
accessibility means all insured Canadians have reasonable access to medical facilities 
(Government of Canada 1985). The provision of the CHT to uphold the five principles helps 
provinces and territories provide Canadians with Medicare of reasonable quality, but an 
amendment made to the CHT formula in 2014 may compromise the overall objective of the CHT 
                                                 
1 A possible reason for Medicare being a part of Canadian identity is Canadians desire to differentiate themselves 
from the Americans. The United States has a large privately funded primary care component and Canada seeks to 
differentiate itself from its neighbour through its universal public Medicare system (Dufresne et al. 2014). 
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and potentially threaten the ability of some provinces to provide Medicare services (Government 
of Canada 1985). 
In 2014, the CHT allocation formula was amended from an equal-per-capita total cash 
and tax point transfer to a simple equal-per-capita cash transfer. An allocation on equal-per-
capita cash basis means the only factor that determines a province or territory’s CHT entitlement 
is the total number of residents in the province or territory. The federal government claimed the 
amendment would treat the provinces more equally, and respect their autonomy over Medicare, 
but this policy change is incongruent with national healthcare policy objectives from a number of 
perspectives (Vodrey 2012). First, an equal-per-capita distribution assumes all Canadians have 
the same health needs and the same abilities to access Medicare services; the amendment stands 
in contradiction to empirical evidence illustrating that health needs and access to services vary 
across the population (Hay 1988; Marchildon and Mou 2014; Rosella et al. 2014). The 2014 
CHT formula amendment also assumes the costs of providing Medicare are the same per person 
and fails to recognize the additional costs of providing Medicare in some provinces or territories 
compared with others, due to age, distance to medical treatment centres, and socio-economic 
status, resulting in an inefficient and inequitable CHT (Stillborn 1997).  
Indeed the ten provinces and three territories in Canada have different needs and costs for 
Medicare. Table 1.1 below summarizes some of the major disparities among the provinces and 
territories that may influence the cost of providing Medicare to their residents.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Although there are significant differences between the provinces and the territories in geographic dispersion of 
population, the territories receive funding from the federal government (Territory Formula Financing, TFF) to 
mitigate the cost of providing public services to isolated communities and the amount of TFF for each territory is 
much larger than their CHT entitlement (Department of Finance Canada 2016). If the CHT formula included 
indicator of location of population for the territories, the need of territories due to location would be double counted. 
For this reason, the discussion in this study focuses more on the disparities among provinces than on the differences 
between provinces and territories.   
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Table 1.1 Major Disparities among Provinces and Territories in 2014 
 Size of 
provincial 
population (% 
share of 
Canada) 
Share of 
population over 
age 65 within the 
province/territory 
Population-
weighted average 
distance to the 
nearest urban 
center  
Per Capita 
CHT  ($) 
2014 
Alberta 3,790,191 (11%) 10% 39km $903.58 
British Columbia 4,499,139 (13%) 15% 28km $903.58 
Manitoba 1,233,728 (4%) 14% 49km $903.58 
New Brunswick 755,530 (2%) 16% 37km $903.58 
Newfoundland 525,037 (2%) 16% 63km $903.58 
North West 
Territories 45,400 (0.13%) 7.71% 372km $903.58 
Nova Scotia 944,469 (3%) 16% 34km $903.58 
Nunavut 34,100 (0.10%) 4.11% 1445km $903.58 
Ontario 13,263,544 (39%) 14% 25km $903.58 
Prince Edward 
Island 144,038 (<1%) 16% 20km $903.58 
Quebec 8,007,656 (23%) 16% 22km $903.58 
Saskatchewan 1,066,349 (3%) 14% 53km $903.58 
Yukon 35,800 (0.10%) 11.45% 477km $903.58 
Source: Marchildon and Mou 2014; PBO 2014)  
Table 1.1 shows that the Canadian population is not evenly distributed across the ten 
provinces. Ontario and Quebec are home to more than 50% of the Canadian population. A large 
part of the remaining population is concentrated in Alberta and British Columbia, with a 
minority occupying the Atlantic provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward 
Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the prairie provinces of Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan. The table shows the different age structure of populations across the country with 
Alberta having the lowest percentage of seniors, while Quebec and Atlantic provinces have the 
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oldest population profiles. The provinces also differ substantially in relation to the average 
distance of residents from the nearest urban center. 3 The distances matter because the cost of 
providing Medicare services to citizens in remote locations is higher than the cost for citizens in 
urban locations due to the cost of transportation equipment (i.e. ambulances and planes) and the 
higher cost of staff (Hurley et al. 2003).  
Finally, Table 1.1 shows the per capita CHT allocation in 2014. The per-capita 
entitlement of CHT is the same across provinces and territories despite the inherent disparities 
among them. The inherent differences between the provinces and territories suggest that, even if 
the provinces and territories had the same capacities to raise revenue, an equal-per capita 
distribution of CHT would not enable the provinces and territories to provide comparable levels 
of Medicare services.  
A potential method to ensure the provinces and territories are able to provide comparable 
levels of Medicare services is by recognizing the inherent population differences and adopting a 
needs-based allocation formula (NBF). This study aims to answer if it is possible to change the 
current CHT formula to a needs-based formula that ensures the allocation is equitable and 
minimizes perverse incentives. The study further examines if it is feasible to implement a needs-
based formula given the current Canadian context.  
There is a large literature on NBFs for the distribution of health-care resources within a 
province in Canada. Gravelle et al. (2003) and Kephart and Asada (2009) have conducted 
empirical studies to evaluate the merits of a needs-based allocation of funding against a simple 
equal-per-capita distribution, and concluded that a needs-based formula was better because an 
equal-per-capita distribution fails to consider the differing needs and costs within a population. 
However, they focused on the empirical linkage between health-care cost and potential needs 
indicators and failed to provide a conceptual framework about the construct of a needs-based 
formula. McIntosh et al. (2010) conducted a comparative study of the Canadian provinces that 
use a needs-based formula to distribute health-care funding to health regions. Their study 
                                                 
3 The average distance is calculated as the population size weighted average distance of citizens from the nearest 
urban center. This indicator thus captures both distribution of population and distances. The average distance is 
preferred to the share of rural population in total population because using the latter may be misleading. According 
to Statistics Canada, Prince Edward Island has a high share of rural population (i.e. 55%), but the average distance 
needed to travel to an urban centre is the lowest in the country because the population lives close to the two urban 
centers (Marchildon and Mou 2014). Therefore, a simple calculation of rural population size in an allocation 
formula would not necessarily reflect the true needs of those who live far away from urban centres.  
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focussed on the formula composition within each province and provided detailed explanations as 
to how each variable related to health needs. However, the study did not answer the important 
question of why (or why not) each province adopted the needs-based approach, and why and 
how specific need indicators were chosen from an assortment of available indicators.  
Eyles and colleagues (1993) proposed a needs-based formula for the government of 
Ontario Ministry of Health because they argued the needs-based approach better reflected the 
policy objectives of Medicare (i.e. meet the needs of Canadians) than did a utilization based 
allocation system. The authors provided an array of policy options weighing the pros and cons of 
using various indicators of need (i.e. demographics, mortality, and socio-economic status). The 
authors further suggested that the likelihood of a needs-based formula in Ontario was great both 
technically and politically, the latter of which was confirmed by the fact that Ontario adopted a 
needs-based formula in 1993 (McIntosh et al 2010). The technical aspect of the Eyles and 
colleagues paper is useful in understanding the pros and cons of using various indicators of need; 
however, the political lessons from the paper are less important to the study on the CHT because 
CHT is a national program while Ontario’s transfer is a transfer to health regions. The difference 
between the two transfers is the CHT is a federal transfer to the provinces who have jurisdiction 
over Medicare, while Ontario’s transfer is a transfer to regions who do not have jurisdiction over 
Medicare. The difference between the two transfers means political tension is likely to be higher 
in the context of the federation (CHT) than in Ontario. 
Compared with the literature on a NBF for health transfer allocation within the provinces, 
there are few studies on adopting an NBF for CHT at the federal level. Among the few studies on 
a NBF for CHT, Hutchinson and colleagues (1999) argued that the federal government should 
adopt a needs-based formula for the Canada Health and Social Transfer (precursor to the CHT 
and CST) because it would reflect the needs of the population. They argued that allocating 
resources based on need coincided with the values of Canadians because Canadians want their 
Medicare system to be available to those who need medical treatment. The authors suggested an 
NBF would be ideal because an NBF was more transparent than a risk based formula that relies 
on disease prevalence data. The authors did not provide empirical evidence regarding what such 
an NBF would look like and provided no method to design an NBF. Further, the authors did not 
provide detail on how policy makers could implement an NBF. To date, there is little literature 
on the design of an NBF for the CHT.  
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Marchildon and Mou (2014) first designed an NBF for CHT. They argued that due to the 
disparities in population age and population dispersion throughout the Canadian provinces and 
territories, the equal-per-capita formula meant a lower share of CHT for several provinces than 
under the former CHT allocation and that this could potentially erode national Medicare 
standards (Marchildon and Mou 2014). They suggested the CHT allocation should adopt the 
needs based approach and change the equal-per-capita formula to incorporate population age and 
location variables. Although Marchildon and Mou (2014) proposed and justified a simple needs-
based formula for the CHT, they did not provide policy makers with a theoretical guideline about 
how to understand needs and how to make a practical needs-based formula, nor did they offer 
examples of needs-based formulas used in other countries.  
Indeed, An NBF is a more equitable distribution of the CHT compared with an equal-per-
capita allocation, but developing an NBF raises numerous issues. An NBF requires need 
indicators based on theoretical justification and support of empirical evidence. Developing a 
formula is difficult for policy makers because the empirical evidence required is not always 
available and the more nebulous a formula is the more complex and less transparent it becomes. 
In addition, some variables that measure need uphold equity but reflect an inefficient distribution 
of resources. Policy makers must have a clear understanding of needs and simultaneously 
balance equity and efficiency concerns in order to choose among a variety of need indicators 
(Peterson and Alexander 2002).  
However, there is surprisingly almost no research exists that studies the theoretical 
foundation of a needs-based allocation. The existing NBFs include an array of “need” indicators 
but no study has clearly defined need and laid out the relationship between need and the overall 
cost of health-care. In addition, although all legitimate needs can be potentially included in 
NBFs, trade-offs between equity and efficiency are necessary and few have defined the equity 
and efficiency criteria in the context of selecting need indicators. Among the few theoretical 
discussion of needs-based formula, Smith et al. (2001) recognized the importance of defining 
and disentangling the inefficiencies of using individual health data in the needs-based allocation 
of health funding in England. For example, local service providers may change the number and 
quality of services provided based on funding received (i.e. perverse incentive). However, their 
work is limited to one component of needs-based allocation (efficiency) and does not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the basic concepts and reasoning behind a NBF for health 
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transfers. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the theoretical foundation of NBF has to 
be formed to guide the discussion of NBFs.   
A second gap in the current literature is the lack of an analysis of the contextual factors 
behind the development of NBFs (Penno et al. 2013). Policy makers interested in changing the 
CHT may make informed decisions by examining other NBFs. However, existing comparative 
analyses focus on similarities and differences in formula composition (e.g., Rice and 
Smith1999), but do not delve into why countries adopted the needs-based allocation approach 
and how and why that formula evolved over time.  
 This paper intends on expanding on the body of literature summarized above, and seeks 
to fill the literature gap by proposing a theoretical framework to define health-care need, 
understand the relationship between needs and other factors that contribute to the overall cost of 
health-care, and establish the equity and efficiency criteria for designing an NBF. The result of 
this study provides a template for policy makers who are interested in developing or modifying 
an NBF 
 This study then aims to answer the question: is it possible to design a needs-based 
allocation formula for CHT that is equitable but also minimizes perverse incentives? To answer 
this question, the study takes a two-pronged approach: it first evaluates the commonly used need 
indicators against equity and efficiency criteria. The study finds that the only need indicators that 
satisfy both equity and efficiency criteria are age, sex, and location of population because the 
three are equitable (i.e. reflect health-care need) and efficient (i.e. minimize perverse incentives).  
The study then considers the feasibility of an NBF in Canada through a comparative, 
contextual analysis of Australia and Canada’s transfer-development histories. The comparative 
study explains why the two countries took different approaches in allocating federal health 
transfers and outlines the important institutional and political conditions necessary for adopting 
an NBF in Canada. The comparative study concludes that it is unlikely Canada could adopt an 
NBF for the CHT in the short term because of the structure of federalism in Canada. However, 
because of Canadians’ belief in universal Medicare, it is possible that the two levels of 
governments could take the Australian approach and collaborate through formal bodies in order 
to uphold a national standard in Medicare.  
In practice, the Canadian federal government already considers needs when it uses the 
Territorial Funding Formula to allocate funds to the three northern territories of Canada. The 
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federal government recognizes that the remoteness of the population in the territories causes 
higher costs for public services and attempts to mitigate the higher costs by providing additional 
funding support. Despite the recognition of need, the Territorial Funding Formula does not 
include specific indicators of need, nor does it used a mathematical formula to allocate funds to 
the territories. The principle behind the Territorial Funding Formula is important because the 
government recognizes that inherent differences exist in the country and seeks to mitigate the 
issue. The same principles are useful in the context of CHT. This study provides policy makers a 
framework for designing a NBF for the CHT based on the same principle of recognizing needs.  
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter one provides a theoretical foundation of 
NBF and defines a desirable NBF. Chapter two identifies the commonly used need indicators of 
health-care in the literature and discusses their pros and cons against the equity and efficiency 
criteria established in chapter one. Chapter three delves into the methodology of the thesis – a 
comparative analysis of Canada’s federal health-transfer system and Australia’s federal 
equalization program. The analysis uses a historical-institutionalism lens to draw lessons from 
the Australian history. Chapter four tells the story of Canada’s federal health-transfer 
development in conjunction with Australia’s story of transfer evolution, and provides a number 
of important lessons Canadian policy makers can draw from the Australian experience. Chapter 
five concludes the thesis by summarizing the study, identifying the limitations of the study, and 
highlighting directions for further research on this topic.   
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CHAPTER 1 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The success of a government program requires two essential conditions - the program has to be 
desirable and practical (Rose 2005). A formula is desirable if it is both equitable and efficient. In 
the context of a funding allocation formula, equity means it is fair to the population and 
promotes national values; equity exists if money distribution meets population needs. Efficiency 
means maximizing output from the health transfer and minimizing perverse incentives for 
subnational and federal governments. 4   
The second necessary condition is practicality. This condition has two sub-criteria: 
political feasibility and transparency. If a formula is acceptable by government and the public, 
the formula is politically feasible. A transparent formula implies the public can understand the 
formula and the rationale behind formula development.  
If a formula is both desirable and practical, it has the highest possibility of success. If a 
formula is neither desirable nor practical, it is not likely to succeed. A formula that is practical 
but not desirable fails to achieve the primary objectives of a program. A formula that is desirable 
but not practical is unlikely to become law because of political backlash, in which case 
implementation of the formula is only possible when the practicality condition is met in the 
future. Table 1.2 summarizes the framework.  
 
Table 1.2 Two Essential Conditions for the Success of a NBF 
 
 Desirability (Equitable, Efficient) 
High Low 
Practicality 
(feasibility, 
transparency) 
High Yes Not wanted 
Low Possible in Future No 
 
                                                 
4 A perverse incentive is a negative outcome resulting from an otherwise good intension. 
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This framework describes the key conditions for a policy program to work, which in turn 
depend on the institutions and context of a country at a particular time. Creating such a 
conceptual framework is useful because it provides a guide for policy makers designing an NBF.  
1.1 The Basic Concepts of a Needs-Based Capitation Formula 
1.1.1 Needs-Based Capitation Allocation Formula 
Before discussing an NBF, it is important to learn how such a formula works. An NBF is a 
method of allocating scarce resources based on the headcount of a population in a given region, 
adjusted for certain population need indicators (Chaplin 2011). Making a capitation formula 
based on need requires a number of steps.  
The first step is to select appropriate indicators of need and to integrate them into a 
formula. Step two is to compute the provincial/territorial aggregate needs based on the need 
formula. The national health-care need is the sum of all provincial/territorial needs. Step three is 
to find each province’s relative needs-based share of the federal health transfer that is calculated 
as the share of each province’s aggregate need within the national aggregate need. Multiplying 
each province’s needs-based share with the federal total budget for the health transfer gives the 
total amount allocated to each province. Finally, in step four, the capitation rate of the health 
transfer is determined by dividing total transfer entitlement of a province by the provincial 
population. The final number obtained by the following formula yields a per capita amount based 
on relative need of the population in a province/territory:  
 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁/𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 =(𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝/𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝/𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝           (1) 
 
Clearly, the definition and selection of need indicators are important in the design of an NBF. 
However, there is no agreed definition of need in the literature, which makes creating an NBF 
complicated. Below, I define need before establishing the criteria for selecting need indicators. 
1.1.2 Defining Need 
In health-care literature, the two common definitions of “need” are medical necessity and 
capacity to benefit (Birch and Eyles 1991; HSIP 2006). The CHA uses the term “medically 
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necessary” to identify publicly fundable Medicare (i.e. primarily services provided by doctors 
and in hospitals), but the CHA fails to define what “medical necessity” is and leaves the 
definition open to interpretation by health-care practitioners. This definition of need is 
appropriate because professionals with medical knowledge make educated decisions and 
determine who requires health-care services. The “medical necessity” definition thus separates 
health-care needs from health-care wants. Nonetheless, this definition has the potential to create 
inefficiencies because practitioners may have a financial incentive to induce their patients to 
receive more treatment than required.  
Aside from medical necessity, the “capacity to benefit from the treatment” definition of 
need assumes a need exists if the value of treating the patient exceeds the costs of treatment 
(Birch et al. 1993). This definition indicates governments should prioritize their interventions in 
health-care by identifying which services provide the largest financial benefit to all Canadians. A 
government may choose to prioritize acute care over chronic care because the marginal benefit to 
Canadians is greater when treating acute conditions than when treating chronic diseases. In this 
way, resource allocation maximizes benefit.  
Medical necessity and capacity to benefit seek to promote different goals; medical 
necessity promotes equity and fairness, whereas capacity to benefit promotes collective social 
welfare and efficiency. The more appropriate definition of need for the CHT is medical necessity 
because it conforms to the values Canadians place on their Medicare system. Canadians see 
equal and timely access to health-care services based on need as a right of citizenship (Romanow 
2002) and an NBF for the CHT should use the need definition consistent with the values 
Canadians put on Medicare.  
1.1.3 Needs, Non-Needs, and the Total Cost of Medicare in Canada 
The federal and provincial government are obligated to ensure Canadians have access to 
essential public services (Government of Canada 1982). The constitutional requirement implies 
the federal government could have a role in Medicare and further implies the federal allocation 
formula should reflect the cost for needed Medicare services. Nevertheless, not all Medicare 
costs reflect actual needs; some Medicare costs lack empirical evidence to suggest medical 
necessity (e.g., supplier induced demand) (Stevens and Gillam 1998; Kephart and Asada 2009).  
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Figure 1.1 Decomposition of Medicare Costs 
 
Figure 1.1 details the relationship between needs and the total cost of the Canadian 
Medicare system. Areas 1 and 2 in the figure are both need factors and, together, determine the 
total volume of Medicare needed by the population. Realized needs or “met needs” fall in area 2 
and are reflected in the overall cost of Medicare, but among medically necessary needs, some 
needs are unmet and revealed by area 1. An unmet need is unaddressed by the current medical 
system. Populations generally have unmet needs because access to services is limited. Barriers to 
access are the result of socio-economic status, geography, lack of infrastructure and staff, 
jurisdictional ambiguities, and language or cultural barriers (Reading and Wien 2009).  
Non-needs factors are areas 3 and 4, which, when combined, determine the additional 
cost of Medicare. Area 3 represents overutilization of Medicare, usually because of moral hazard 
of patients or supplier-induced demand. A moral hazard of patients is an overuse of the Medicare 
system by patients because they have no costs upfront and may use services in excess of need. 
Supplier-induced demand is an excessive use of services at the behest of the Medicare supplier. 
Leaving the assessment of needs to subjective judgements by medical practitioners creates 
supplier-induced demand. Hendee et al. (2010) examined over-utilization of health-care and 
identified that the major cause of over-utilization was individual (patients and doctors) decision 
making. A fee-for service model compensates physicians based on the number of times 
physicians see their patients. Hendee et al. (2010) identified that the fee-for service model of 
compensating physicians created over-utilization because physicians have an incentive to send 
patients for unnecessary diagnostics. The authors also cited that over-utilization is not 
necessarily the result of financial incentive. Physicians may not have the best knowledge on 
current practices or on the medical history of their patients, which could result in the physician 
sending the patient for unnecessary testing. Another problem identified by the authors is the 
issue of duplicate testing. A patient may not disclose that they have undergone specific testing 
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recently, and a new physician may send the patient for unnecessary retesting. In 2007, 9% of 
patients surveyed in Canada stated they received duplicate testing (CF 2008). Clearly, over-
utilization exists in the current Medicare system. Implementing an NBF for the CHT will not 
solve the over-utilization of Medicare.5 However, policy makers designing an NBF for the CHT 
should be mindful that allocating the CHT based on Medicare utilization could exacerbate the 
issue of over-utilization already present in Canada.  
Furthermore, area 4 represents the factors not reflected in the other three areas; usually, 
the input cost factors influence the average cost of providing Medicare given a volume of need. 
Input cost factors include, for example, technology, physician salaries, and the cost associated 
with service location. Areas 3 and 4 represent cost factors that are not included in need 
measurement but contribute to the overall cost of Medicare.  
The total cost of Medicare is the sum of realized needs, overutilization, and input costs 
(i.e. area 2+3+4=5). Unmet needs (area 1) are unrealized and therefore the total cost of Medicare 
does not include unmet needs. An ideal needs-based formula would include variables accounting 
for and affecting all legitimate needs. Legitimate needs include realized needs for those who 
require care and receive treatment, and unmet needs. Some of the input costs (area 4) are not a 
need but they can affect access to services for those who have need. For example, a person’s 
proximity to medical services can affect access to the service (i.e. citizens in remote locations 
have difficulty accessing medical services), but a person’s proximity to medical services does not 
mean a person has a medical need (i.e. citizens in remote locations do not necessarily have more 
needs). Overutilization (area 3) is not a legitimate need because the use of the Medicare system 
is in excess of need (i.e. supplier induced demand or moral hazard of patients), but 
overutilization is still captured in the total cost of Medicare.  
1.2 Criteria for Selecting Need indicators for an NBF 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates a decomposition of the total cost of Medicare and the relationship 
among the components. Among the various factors, policy makers need to pick the appropriate 
need and cost indicators to promote their policy objectives. Meeting equity and efficiency criteria 
is crucial when choosing these need and cost indicators for an NBF (Magnussen 2010).   
                                                 
5 Removing the incentive for physicians would require changing the fee-for-service model. Physicians would require 
more information on best practices given a patient’s individual circumstances and patients would need to disclose 
their medical history with their physician. Solving the issue of over-utilization of Medicare in Canada is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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1.2.1 Equity 
Medicare remains an integral part of Canadian nationhood because many Canadians are proud of 
how Medicare predicates universal medical treatment for all. The Commission of the Future of 
Health Care in Canada found that Canadians support the core values of equity, fairness, and 
solidarity in their Medicare system (Romanow 2002). In addition, these core values coincide 
with the Canadian understanding of citizenship. Clearly, equity is an important part of Canadian 
Medicare, which precludes that a funding allocation formula designed to support the Canadian 
Medicare system should include equity.  
There are two types of equity in Medicare: equity of health outcome, and equity of 
access. Equity of outcome means all people have the same opportunity to live a healthy life. 
Equity of access means that all people have the same opportunity to use Medicare services 
regardless of income, education, or location (Kirigia 2009). Equity of access is a more 
appropriate definition when defining equity in NBFs because the determinants of a healthy life 
are not solely reliant on Medicare. Health outcomes are the result of a myriad of controllable and 
uncontrollable factors. The World Health Organization identifies where a person lives, the state 
of the environment, genetics, income, age, sex, and social networks combine to affect one’s 
health outcomes. Factors such as genetic predisposition and other factors are non-controllable, 
but health outcomes are also influenced by individual circumstances and individual choices. For 
example, a person’s choice to smoke cigarettes can have a negative impact on his/her health 
outcome (WHO 2016). In addition, it is widely accepted that the measure of health outcomes or 
one’s perception of a healthy life are inevitably different, which means the allocation of 
Medicare resources based on equity of outcome is inappropriate (CIHI 2008). Statistical 
evidence also shows an unclear picture attempting to link health spending to health outcomes. 
For example, the Commonwealth Fund recently ranked Canada tenth among developed countries 
in terms of providing quality, equitable, and efficient health-care (CF 2014). In 2014, Canada 
only ranked higher than the United States while Australia ranked fourth. According to the report, 
Canada spends more on healthcare per capita than Australia but achieves worse outcomes than 
Australia. This study demonstrates that it is unclear how financial inputs link to health outcomes 
and therefore warrants deeper investigation. Given these problems with measuring and assessing 
health outcomes, equity of access is a more appropriate definition because it coincides with the 
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values Canadians place on their Medicare system – Canadians value timely access to their 
Medicare system based on need for medical services (Romanow 2002). 
Equity of access is the most appropriate definition of equity and can be evaluated against 
the two measures of equity. Using egalitarian theory, Mooney (2000) argues there are two types 
of equity: vertical equity and horizontal equity. Horizontal equity means those of equal condition 
should be treated equally; in Medicare, this means that all those with the same Medicare needs 
receive equal treatment (Le Grand 1987). Vertical equity means those with unequal condition 
warrant unequal treatment; in Medicare, this means that someone with a more severe case 
warrants more care or more aggressive treatment of his/her condition. These definitions coincide 
with the principles in Canada Health Act and the overarching Medicare values Canadians hold 
because the purpose of Medicare in Canada is to provide medically necessary services to all 
Canadians who need them (Government of Canada 1985), or in other words, meet the Medicare 
needs of all Canadians. The current equal-per-capita CHT formula treats Canadians accessing 
Medicare with horizontal equity; however, Canadians’ need for and access to health-care 
services vary as demonstrated in Table 1.1. This implies CHT should also reflect the criterion of 
vertical equity by allocating more resources to regions with higher needs (Le Grand 1987; 
Mooney 2000). The resulting need-based formula, based on the principle of vertical equity, 
would support the sense of nationhood drawn from Medicare because it recognizes inherent 
disparities in health needs among the population and seeks to mitigate these differences 
(Romanow 2002; Kirigia 2009).  
1.2.2 Efficiency 
Unlike equity, efficiency is not an explicit value or principle examined in the CHA or the 
Constitution Act, but an NBF should aim to maximize social benefit (Smith et al. 2001). 
Consistent with the objectives of the CHA, efficiency requires that more resources go to those 
who have the greatest need. An efficient allocation formula means the marginal cost of CHT 
(money transferred to the provinces) equals the marginal benefit (improvement in health status). 
To meet the criteria of efficiency, a formula should include variables measuring legitimate needs 
or legitimate non-needs while minimizing perverse incentives. A perverse incentive is the 
negative result of an otherwise good intention. For example, if the government provided the 
provinces with funds based on socio-economic status, provinces may avoid addressing socio-
economic concerns. For example, if “poor housing condition,” a proxy for socio-economic 
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status, was included in a CHT allocation formula, the receiving provincial government may not 
create policies to alleviate poor housing conditions because the government receives CHT based 
on the number of poor houses it has. The use of “poor housing condition” as a variable in an 
NBF could create a perverse incentive. Policy makers should therefore attempt to find need 
indicators that minimize or are free of perverse incentives. For example, the use of an age 
indicator is free of perverse incentive. Age cannot be manipulated (an individual is either 65 or 
he or she is not 65), which means age meets the criteria of efficiency.  
In policy decision making, policy makers often confront the trade-offs between equity 
and efficiency, and creating an NBF is no exception. The ultimate objective of the formula is to 
ensure equitable and timely access to Medicare based on need rather than the ability to pay 
(Romanow 2002). In addition, Canadians pay for their Medicare system through taxation and 
expect their governments to spend wisely on the services they need, which implies government 
should spend taxpayer money efficiently. The criteria of equity and efficiency are helpful for 
policy makers in choosing need indicators that reflect the health needs of Canadians and, 
simultaneously, maximize the possible benefit in allocating financial resources. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CREATING A NEEDS-BASED FORMULA 
2.1 Need Indicators 
Chapter 1 sets the framework for developing a desirable NBF by identifying the core 
components of a needs-based capitation formula, defining need, creating a link between need and 
costs, and establishing the equity and efficiency criteria for selecting need indicators. The next 
step in designing a desirable NBF is to find appropriate indicators of need. Three commonly used 
categories of need indicators are utilization, demographics, and socio-economic status. Below I 
first describe these need indicators and then evaluate these need indicators against the equity and 
efficiency criteria.  
2.1.1 Utilization of Health-Care 
The utilization of health-care is a commonly used indicator of direct need (Hutchinson et 
al.1999; Hurley 2004; Hurley et al. 2004). Utilization data measures the number of services used, 
whether or not services are medically necessary. Gravelle et al. (2003) and Vallejo-Torres et al. 
(2009) argued a utilization model is a useful method to indicate need, but utilization data fails to 
capture overutilization (area 3 in Figure 1.1) and unmet need (area 1 in Figure 1.1. For this 
reason, Gravelle et al. (2003) suggested against direct use of utilization data. Instead, they argued 
that the utilization data adjusted for distance to hospitals, wait times, and ethnicity better reflects 
actual need because these adjustments capture some of the unmet needs. For example, because 
people wait to receive medical treatment, they have unmet needs not captured by utilization data. 
Gravelle et al. (2003) also argued using ethnicity as an indicator of need because Canadian 
Aboriginals often have unmet need.  
2.1.2 Population Demographics 
Direct indicators of need such as utilization have the bias of including overutilization and 
ignoring unmet needs. Policy makers have the option of using indirect indicators of need that can 
capture the expected needs in a population. A common indirect indicator of need is demographic 
data. Mustard and Derksen (1997) conducted a study measuring the health status of the 
Manitoban population. They concluded regions with larger senior populations required more 
funding because of the increased health costs associated with demographics. The Canadian 
Institute for Health Information found in 2010 that seniors over age 65 on average accounted for 
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14% of a provinces population; however, on average, seniors over 65 used over 44% of health-
care resources in the provinces (CIHI 2011). Furthermore, a study using the Canadian 
Community Health Survey attempted to link health-care use to health behaviours and socio-
demographics. From a sample of 91,223 adults over the age of 18, the survey concluded health-
care usage correlated with the province’s demographics (Rosella et al. 2014). Nevertheless, some 
research suggested the entire elderly population of Canada is not in need of more health-care 
funding. Roos and Shapiro (1981) studied patient-interview results about ambulatory services 
and hospital stays in the province of Manitoba, and they concluded on average, the elderly 
population aged 65 to 86 did not require more in health funding than the younger population (i.e. 
1 to 64 years of age). Comparatively, those who were in high age brackets (i.e. over 86 years of 
age) needed substantially more health-care than the younger population. Marchildon and Mou 
(2014) used data from the Canadian Institute of Health Information (CIHI) to demonstrate the 
general relationship among age, sex, and average Medicare cost in the provinces and territories.  
Figure 2.1 Provincial/Territorial Government Average Medicare Expenditures by Age and 
Sex Using the 2010 CIHI Data 
 
 Source: Marchildon and Mou (2014) 
The figure clearly shows that as one ages the cost of Medicare varies. Infants are 
associated with high Medicare cost (i.e. the high cost in the age <one category). However, the 
cost considerably drops after birth and remains steady until the latter years of life. After age 80, 
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the cost grows quickly according to CIHI (CIHI 2011). These patterns suggest distribution of 
population age has an impact on Medicare cost.  
The data also shows that although there are differences in average Medicare costs 
between females and males; sex does not have as great an impact on Medicare costs as age. 
According to CIHI, females on average incur a higher total Medicare cost than males (CIHI 
2014). Women cost more than males because women incur an additional cost during the 
childbearing years and women statistically live longer and tend to have more chronic conditions 
than men (Blakely et al. 2014; CIHI 2014). In addition, men have higher rates of fatal illnesses 
than women do, men are more likely to die of heart attacks or strokes, and men are more likely to 
die because of an accident or commit suicide (Smith 2006). This means the cost of providing 
health-care for women is extended over a longer period. However, other factors of health suggest 
that men in some circumstances cost the health-care system more than females. For example, 
men are more likely to smoke and drink which can lead to major health problems like cancer 
(PHAC 2013). Men are also likely to avoid medical treatment for conditions despite needing 
medical attention (Hay 1988). Overall, the evidence suggests that there are significant 
differences in the average cost between males and females.  
In practice, NBFs in developed countries commonly use demographics such as age and 
sex to indicate need (Rice and Smith 1999). However, demographics indicators fail to capture the 
unmet needs of those who tend not to seek medical treatment even if they need it. To mitigate the 
non-representation of unmet needs, England uses a combination of mortality data and 
demographics. This combination variable is a clinical indicator called the Standardized Mortality 
Ratio (SMR). An SMR is the ratio of observed deaths (mortality) in a sample population and the 
expected deaths of the total population. The ratio adjusts by the distribution of demographics of a 
population. A Standardized Mortality Ratio is a good clinical indicator of need because it shows 
how a given region compares to the total national population in terms of specific medical 
conditions. For example, if the standard SMR score for heart attacks of the national reference 
group is 1.0 but the comparable population in the province of Saskatchewan has an SMR score 
of 1.7, then the citizens of Saskatchewan are 70% more likely to suffer from heart attacks than 
the rest of Canada.  
Using the age-adjusted mortality in a funding allocation formula, Carr-Hill (1989) found 
resource distribution was more equitable than distributing based on mortality alone. In a similar 
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research on the province of Ontario, Beddard and colleagues (1999) examined potential ways 
policy makers could allocate funds based on health needs. They examined SMRs and found 
SMRs were a reliable method to measure health-care needs but found the link between an SMR 
and direct funding unclear. For example, they questioned whether a region with 10% greater 
SMR than its neighbouring region should receive 10% more in funding. The question posed the 
issue of meeting need. Although an SMR gives an indication of some relative health need, it does 
not account for all need. Therefore, the use of an SMR may disadvantage one area where 
legitimate needs exist, in favour of another area. Because of this unsolved problem, Beddard and 
colleagues (1999) advised the Ontario government against using SMR to indicate need. 
2.1.3 Socio-economic Status 
Demographics are useful indicators to identify population needs. However, demographic 
indicators do not capture all needs within a population. In addition to using mortality indicators, 
measuring unmet need is possible by examining a population’s socio-economical characteristics. 
Wilkins and Adams (1978) studied Montreal’s population and found those in the lowest quintile 
of education and income had the lowest life expectancy and the highest disease prevalence. Their 
study showed that education attainment data is a good proxy for measuring health need rather 
than using disease prevalence data. In another study, Wilkins et al. (1990) studied the mortality 
rate of urban populations in Canada from 1971 to 1986 and found those in lower income groups 
had lower life expectancy and greater disease prevalence. The results of the study coincided with 
the results found by Wilkins and Adams (1978) insofar as the study concluded that income (like 
education) is a good indicator to measure health need. In his study of two thousand males from 
the 1978 Canadian Health Survey, Hay (1988) found a male’s socio-economic status and health 
status positively correlated. Hay argued that men tend to under-report health status, making it 
difficult to conclude how much health resource men need. However, socio-economic status could 
account for need not captured by sex (Hay 1988). Recently, a Canadian Institute for Health 
Information study looked at socio-economic status and health status in Canada’s Census 
Metropolitan Areas and found those with lower education and income have greater health-care 
need than the highly educated and wealthy (CIHI 2008). The CIHI study reaffirmed the findings 
of Hay, Wilkins, and Adams by demonstrating health need relate to socio-economic status. 
Scholars have also identified that Aboriginal status correlates with relatively lower socio-
economic status and therefore higher health need.  
 21 
In fact, Aboriginal status alone does not indicate health need (i.e. Aboriginals have more 
health needs because they are Aboriginal); Aboriginals have more health-care needs because of 
their relatively lower socio-economic status than non-Aboriginals do (Williams and Sternthal 
2010). D’Arcy (1989) found the Canadian Aboriginal population had greater health-care needs 
than the non-Aboriginal population. The Aboriginal population has a myriad of health disparities 
caused by poor socio-economic status or the social determinants of health. Cultural, access, and 
political barriers prevent Aboriginals from accessing the health-care services they need and, 
therefore, some of their needs remain unmet (Reading and Wien 2009). Aboriginal status can 
thus serve as a proxy for Aboriginal population’s generally more challenging socio-economic 
condition than the majority of Canadians, and by extension, for their higher portion of health-
care needs that remain unmet. 
2.1.4 Input Costs 
While demographics and socio-economic status indicators illustrate need for health-care 
services, input costs affect access to health-care and the cost of providing services.  
Among input cost indicators, medical technologies and payments for health-care service 
providers are a necessary cost to the health-care system but they do not reflect need. New 
technologies and an adequate supply of medical practitioners’ improve access to services, but 
these cost factors are fluid and are subject to government control. Governments pay for public 
health provision based on the prices negotiated with medical service providers. Governments 
also choose which technologies to fund. For these reasons, including technologies and salaries of 
Medicare providers in an NBF may create perverse incentives and is thus not efficient.  
Location is an input cost indicator used by many countries with an NBF. Location is an 
input cost factor because the cost of providing medical services is dependent on service location. 
Costs generally increase the further a patient is from a major urban centre. Population 
distribution is inherently different across regions, but governments have an obligation to provide 
Canadians reasonable access to health-care services regardless of their location. Location is thus 
an uncontrollable cost factor, which means a location variable, despite its lack of being a need 
indicator, may be justifiable as an NBF variable because it meets efficiency and equity criteria 
(CGC 2008).  
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2.2 Evaluating and Selecting Need Indicators 
Utilization, demographics, and socio-economic status are useful indicators to capture population 
need, but each indicator group alone is insufficient or problematic. Utilization captured realized 
needs (whether necessary or not), but unmet needs are neglected and over-utilization is included. 
Demographics indirectly capture realized needs but may also neglect some unmet needs. Socio-
economic variables capture some unmet needs, but choosing socio-economic status variables 
requires caution because including these variables could lead to perverse incentives. Input cost 
factors are not needs but may affect access to Medicare services. Policy makers should consider 
these facts when balancing the trade-offs between equity and efficiency in designing an NBF 
(Magnussen 2010).   
According to the equity criteria set up in Chapter 1, selecting need and cost indicators 
based on equity means looking at the promotion of fairness in accessing Medicare services. A 
selection of indicators that ensures access to Medicare services does not place limitations on the 
number of variables chosen. Referring to Figure 1.1, all unmet needs, realized needs, and input 
cost factors meet the criteria of equity because their inclusion ensures horizontal and vertical 
equity in access to Medicare services.  
Reliance on equity alone creates problems because some equity indicators could induce 
perverse incentives. For example, the use of socio-economic indicators has the potential to create 
perverse incentives because government policy can shape indicators. In contrast, indicators such 
as demographics do not produce perverse incentives. Demographics are free of manipulation and 
therefore reside outside government control.  
Based on the criteria identified in the theoretical framework, the only need indicators that 
satisfy both equity and efficiency criteria are age, sex, and location. Age meets the criteria of 
equity because older people have greater need for health-care services than the young do. Sex 
meets the criteria of equity because women have a greater need for health-care services than men 
do. Location meets the criteria of equity because the cost of providing Medicare services to 
Canadians is dependent on location. In addition, the three indicators generate little perverse 
incentives because age, sex, and location cannot be easily manipulated.  
Racial indicators such as Aboriginal status are useful in capturing socio-economic 
disparities; however, racial indicators serve as a proxy for socio-economic indicators and there is 
no a direct link between race and health-care need. Aboriginal populations present a unique 
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challenge, and illustrate a general problem for the inclusion of race into the allocation formula, 
due to the contentions regarding identification. For example, within the federal legislation 
governing Indigenous peoples, non-status Indians and Métis persons do not have the same 
protections and funding that status Indians have (Government of Canada 2010). This becomes 
more confused when considering that status is based on specific genealogical criteria as 
determined by the federal government, not identity, or heritage. Therefore, Aboriginal status 
could be included as a need indicator only when a clearer definition and reliable data about 
Aboriginal identification become available in Canada. 
A possible way to see if an NBF could work in Canada is to examine a country (or 
countries) that currently use an NBF. By examining other countries that use the needs-based 
approach, Canadian policy makers can learn from the experiences of other countries and 
determine if the methods employed by other countries are feasible in Canada. The next section 
examines the various NBFs used in various countries around the world. 
2.3 Needs-based Allocation Formulas in Developed Countries 
 
To design a desirable formula and mitigate potential political risks, policy makers can learn from 
those who developed their own NBFs and confronted similar trade-offs in equity and efficiency. 
In particular, Canadian policy makers can study the need indicators used in the needs-based 
formula for health transfers in other countries and learn how to design a needs-based formula for 
CHT. Table 2.1 is a comprehensive summary of the need and cost indicators, other than 
population size, used in NBFs for funding allocation in developed nations. 
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Table 2.1 Need and Cost Indicators Used in the NBFs of Developed Nations  
Country Formula variables Program name 
Australia Age, Aboriginal, Location, Socio-
economic status 
Equalization 
Finland Age, Disability State Subsidy System 
England Age, Mortality, Morbidity, Socio-
economic status, Ethnicity 
Resource Allocation Formula 
France Age Federal Insurance Office Risk 
Adjustment Scheme 
Italy Age, Sex, Mortality Regional Resource Allocation 
System 
Netherlands Age, Sex, Socio-economic status, 
Urbanization 
Central Sickness Fund Board Risk 
Adjustment Scheme 
New Zealand Age, Sex, Socio-economic status Health Funding Authority 
Northern Ireland Age, Sex, Mortality, Socio-
economic status 
Health Board Allocation Formula 
Norway Age, Sex, Mortality Health Authority Revenue 
Allocation Scheme 
Scotland Age, Sex, Mortality Health Authority Revenue 
Allocation Scheme 
Sweden Age, Socio-economic status Stockholm County Hospital 
Resource Allocation Formula 
Switzerland Age, Sex, Region Federal Association of Sickness 
Funds Risk Adjustment Scheme 
United States Age, Sex, Socio-economic status Medicare 
Wales Age, Sex Health Authority 
Source: author’s compilation based on Rice and Smith (1999) 
Table 2.1 shows that developed countries commonly use NBFs to allocate health-care 
resources. The table reveals that age and sex are the most prevalent need indicators in these 
countries. A probable reason is that age and sex account for health-care needs and are free of 
perverse incentives.  
To capture unmet needs due to sex or socioeconomic status, NBFs in some countries go 
further to include indicators of unmet needs or other unavoidable barriers to access to health-care 
services. For example, some countries use a mortality indicator, some use a type of socio-
economic indicator, and some use a location or region indicator. These countries expanded 
beyond age and sex indicators because the countries placed a higher value on the principle of 
equity rather than seeking to minimize potential perverse incentives.  
Each existing NBF in Table 2.1 is likely a product of the considerations of the equity and 
efficiency criteria described above. Although Table 2.1 is useful for policy makers interested in 
designing an NBF insofar as the table identifies a range of options available to policy makers, 
policy makers need to know why an NBF exists in the first place and how a country ends up with 
a particular formula and the associated trade-off between equity and efficiency. This is because 
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transfer allocation is a zero-sum game and any decision on formula of transfer allocation would 
create winners and losers. For example, although an NBF that adjusts for age, sex, and location is 
both equitable and efficient and is partially used in Australia (i.e. Australia does not include sex), 
it may not be politically feasible in Canada. For example, Marchildon and Mou (2014) found that 
Ontario and Alberta would lose funds if the CHT adjusted for age and remote location, while 
Schwartz (2016) found that Ontario, Alberta and Manitoba would lose if the CHT adjusted for 
age only. The two empirical studies demonstrate that while overall the country benefits from a 
needs-based formula, some provinces will inevitably lose. Schwartz found that Ontario would 
lose 0.36% of its funding when compared to the equal-per capita distribution, while Manitoba 
would lose 1.53%. Alberta would be heavily impacted losing 12.23% in CHT funding.  
Therefore, despite the fact that a needs-based formula would support the national 
standard in Medicare, change to the CHT requires the change be politically feasible and 
transparent. A detailed analysis of the federal and political context of countries of different 
choice of transfer allocation formula will help explain why adopting a needs-based formula is 
possible in one country but may not be feasible in another.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Drawing Lessons 
The theoretical framework and technical composition of health-transfer formulas in other 
countries are helpful to policy makers who want to design an NBF. To make an NBF feasible, 
policy makers also need to know if a technical formula is acceptable given the current political 
climate of a country. For this reason, a comparative study is helpful because policy makers can 
discover how to balance equity and efficiency concerns, justify formula composition, and gauge 
the political climate necessary to foster policy change.  
This study compares Canada and Australia by observing their history of developing 
federal transfer allocation formulas. Although the evolution of the federal transfer allocation 
could relate to many factors, the focus of this study is on the influence of federalism and political 
institutions on the development of federal transfer allocation formula in the two countries. 
Regions within a federation are inherently different and without federal support, poorer regions 
would be unable to provide a comparable level of public services to richer regions. The transfer 
system in a federation is the most important instrument the federal government uses to reduce the 
vertical fiscal gap between the two levels of governments, ensure a minimum standard of public 
services across regions, and promote nationhood. In this sense, federalism and political context is 
the most important factor that influences the development of federal transfers. In terms of the 
policy outcomes to be discussed, although the development of federal transfers affects the health 
outcomes of the population and influences the public-private mix in health financing and the 
total cost and sustainability of Medicare, the study limits policy outcomes to the direct result of 
federal transfers – the allocation of federal transfers to each region. The study refrains from 
making inferences about the other potential policy outcomes because doing so requires rigorous 
theoretical and empirical studies, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
Australia is an ideal comparator for Canada because both countries are federations, 
members of the British Commonwealth, and constitutional monarchies with similar political 
structures. The two countries share large geographic landmasses and have Aboriginal 
populations throughout the country (Watts 2008). However, the two countries have adopted 
different methodologies to address the vertical and horizontal fiscal gaps present in their 
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federations. Australia is a highly centralized federation, where the Commonwealth (i.e. the 
federal government of Australia) holds substantial revenue raising and expenditure power and, in 
turn, uses that power to influence state policy decision making through transfers. The 
Commonwealth and state governments have a strong collaborative relationship that extends over 
many areas of public policy. For example, the Commonwealth and state governments collaborate 
on ways to improve emergency medical care throughout the country. The Commonwealth 
provides reward payments if states can reduce wait times for emergency services, which can 
improve the efficiency of the Australian health-care system (COAG 2011). In contrast, Canada is 
highly decentralized and leaves health-care policy to the provinces (Boothe 1996). The 
decentralized nature of health-care has led to differences in services provided to Canadians 
across provinces and territories. For example, public drug coverage varies across the country. 
Saskatchewan provides public coverage to senior citizens (i.e. over the age of sixty-five) based 
on their income from the previous fiscal year. If a senior’s drug costs exceed 3.4 percent of 
his/her annual income, the government pays 100 percent of the total drug cost less the twenty-
five dollar maximum payment for each drug (Government of Saskatchewan 2016). British 
Columbia uses age and income from the previous two years and additional disability benefits to 
calculate eligibility (Government of British Columbia 2016). If a citizen of British Columbia’s 
drug expenses total three percent of his/her annual income, the government will cover up to 
seventy percent of his/her drug costs. However, if the British Columbian’s drug cost exceeds 
four percent of his/her income then the government covers 100 percent of the drug costs less the 
twenty-five dollar maximum payment for each drug. Private drug insurance schemes are 
different across Canada whereby private coverage is voluntary in provinces except Quebec 
where legislation requires employers to provide private insurance for eligible employees 
(Morgan et al. 2015). The example of provincial drug coverage shows that health-care services 
vary by location and highlights the difficulty in upholding equity and fairness in Canada’s 
universal health-care system. A comparative study of such contextual differences is useful in 
understanding the development of the federal transfer system in each respective country. It 
allows policy makers to evaluate if Australia’s approach to federal transfers is desirable and 
feasible in Canada.  
 Before delving into the transfer systems of Canada and Australia, it is necessary to 
provide a general overview of the two federal transfer systems. The CHT in Canada and the 
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equalization program in Australia are the focus of the study; however, these transfers function 
within the larger transfer system. The transfer system is comprised of other transfers that all 
work together to achieve the goal of addressing fiscal gaps, but also promote national interest. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the transfer systems in Canada and Australia. Both transfer 
systems include general-purpose transfers and specific-purpose transfers. The two types of 
transfers meld together because money received by a government is funnelled into its general 
revenue fund and therefore a decrease in one type of transfer affects the fiscal capacity of the 
government.  
General-purpose transfers are unconditional, meaning the recipient government is free to 
spend the funding at the government’s leisure. Specific-purpose transfers are conditional, 
meaning the recipient government must follow a set of rules on spending the transfer. Canada 
and Australia share a general-purpose transfer (also known as equalization) whereby the federal 
government allocates a set amount of funding to the recipient government annually. Canadian 
equalization is determined based on the revenue-raising capacity of provinces, while Australia 
uses both the revenue-raising capacity and the expenditure needs of states in its allocation of 
equalization funding. Specific-purpose transfers are for specific social policies such as health-
care and education. Canada imposes conditions on the CHT based on the five principles of the 
CHA and imposes the condition of having a zero-residency requirement for the Canada Social 
Transfer (CST). Zero-residency means a province cannot impose a minimum waiting period for a 
citizen to receive social benefits. For example, if a Canadian moved from Saskatchewan to 
Alberta, and was on social assistance, the province of Alberta cannot restrict the Canadian from 
receiving social assistance because the person has not lived in Alberta. Australia’s specific-
purpose transfers are more complex because the transfers are for specific initiatives such as 
improving railway or road infrastructure. The Australian government chooses initiatives to fund 
based on partnerships agreed to by the federal (Commonwealth) and state governments. In terms 
of health-care, Australian specific-purpose payments are for infrastructure, combating wait 
times, and improving health outcomes in both hospitals and communities.  
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Table 3.1 Federal Transfers in Canada and Australia 
 Canada Australia 
General-purpose transfers 
Name Equalization Equalization 
Source revenue General revenue General sales tax (GST) 
Conditions N/A N/A 
Allocation basis Revenue-raising capacity Full fiscal equalization 
Administrative body Federal government Commonwealth Grants 
Commission 
Review Every five years  Every five years 
Specific-purpose transfers 
Name Canada 
Health 
Transfer 
Canada 
Social 
Transfer 
National Health Reform 
Funding, Schools, 
Disabilities, Affordable 
Housing, Skills and 
Workforce Development 
Source Revenue General Revenue General Revenue 
Conditions Five 
principles of 
the Canada 
Health Act 
No residency 
requirement 
Conditions set by the 
Commonwealth on funding 
purposes* 
Allocation Basis Equal per capita Ad Hoc 
Administrative body Federal government Commonwealth government 
Review Ad hoc Ad hoc 
*Conditions set by the Commonwealth government in consultation with state governments to achieve desired 
outcomes. In the case of health-care, wait times and health outcomes predicate the amount given in transfer 
payments.  
 
To narrow the focus of this study, this comparative analysis examines the equalization 
program of Australia and the CHT of Canada. Equalization and CHT are comparable across 
these two countries for three reasons: first, both transfers attempt to help subnational 
governments meet health-care needs. Equalization is the largest federal transfer for financing 
state health-care in Australia (CGC 2008). CHT is the largest federal transfer that supports the 
provinces and territories in providing Medicare services in Canada. Second, the two programs 
have a similar objective. The policy objective of equalization in Australia is to ensure 
Australians have comparable access to public services, including health-care services (CGC 
1995). The policy objective of CHT is to ensure a minimum national standard in Medicare. 
Third, equalization in Australia and CHT in Canada are allocated to all states/provinces and 
territories. 
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Figure 3.1 Roles of Financial Transfers in the Australian Health-Care System 
Note: Red circles and arrows indicate state transfers for health services, blue represent Commonwealth transfers, and 
orange represent a mixture of Commonwealth and private-insurance transfers. 
  
Before discussing the intricacies of the two federal transfer systems, it is important to 
establish a general understanding of how the health-care systems function in each country. 
Australia has a two-tiered health-care system (AIHW 2012). All Australian citizens have access 
to public health-care (i.e. physicians and hospitals). However, private insurance holders or 
patients willing to pay out-of-pocket fees can access private doctors and private hospitals. 
Payment for health-care services is dependent on the service provided by public or private 
insurance. If a patient elects to use public health-care, the cost to the patient is zero dollars. If the 
patient elects to use private services, the government pays seventy-five percent of the cost while 
the patient pays twenty-five percent (i.e. through insurance or out of pocket). The benefit to 
having private insurance is patients have quicker access to services. In addition, private 
insurance holders can choose specific hospitals and physicians. Public patients do not have a 
choice of hospital or physician and are subject to long waiting lists for treatment. The private 
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system covers a wide assortment of services ranging from hospital and physician services to 
dental, optometry, physiotherapy, and elect surgeries (Hall 2016).  
Australian Medicare is a federal jurisdiction, while states control certain areas of health-
care. The Commonwealth pays for its portion of public health through general revenue while 
state government pays for another portion of Medicare using their own general revenue 
supplemented by Commonwealth grants (i.e. equalization). The Commonwealth pays for most 
physician and hospital services while states pay for community services such as home care 
services. However, both levels of government encourage those who are able to pay medical 
services to opt for private service provision whether through private insurance or out of pocket 
fees. The government argument for suggesting private services is to alleviate the pressure on 
public health-care (Hall 2016). The Commonwealth government encourages Australians to 
purchase private health insurance and uses a ‘carrot and stick’ method to entice citizens towards 
private care. The Commonwealth offers tax breaks to high-income earners who purchase private 
insurance. On the other hand, Australians in the top income tax bracket who did not purchase 
private health insurance has to pay a special income tax levy.  
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the role of health transfers in the Australian health-care system. The 
figure demonstrates that the Commonwealth government pays for the majority of public health-
care services in Australia, known as Medicare (including public hospitals, drugs, and residential 
long-term care), and subsidizes private-insurance users who use private insurance to pay for 
physicians, private drugs and hospital services. State governments pay for services such as acute 
mental health-care and community health-care out of state budgets (part of which comes from 
the equalization transfer). States also pay for Commonwealth health services but the money used 
to fund those services comes from the Commonwealth. In addition to providing states with 
money to pay for Medicare, the Commonwealth also transfers funds in the form of Specific 
Purpose Payments (SPP). These earmarked funds are for specific-purposes such as reducing wait 
times and improving health outcomes. Some SPP are bi-lateral (i.e. between one state and the 
Commonwealth). Bi-lateral agreements focus on building infrastructure in specific states. For 
example, the Commonwealth created a SPP for Tasmanian infrastructure projects in 2015, while 
other states were not eligible for SPP infrastructure grants (CGC 2015).  
The Canadian health-care system also has both a private and public component. Private 
insurance cannot cover services already provided by Medicare (i.e. Canadians cannot access 
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private hospitals or private physician services), but private insurance can cover health-care 
services such as prescription drugs, optometry services, physiotherapy, and dental services.  For 
example, prescription drugs are generally not free to Canadians with the exception of some 
seniors and low-income individuals who are eligible for provincial drug plans (Morgan et al. 
2015). The rest of the Canadian population uses either private prescription drug insurance plans 
or pay from their own pocket for drugs (Donaldson et al. 2004).  
General revenue of provincial/territorial governments pays for Medicare that includes 
most physician and hospital services. Access to Medicare is free at the point of use to Canadians. 
Canada also has a sort of two-tiered health-care system whereby some services are provided by 
both public and private systems. Citizens can access diagnostic services such as MRIs through 
private clinics paid by Workers Compensation (Marchildon 2006). However, Canada does not 
have a two-tiered system like Australia because Canadians cannot access physician or many 
hospital services through private insurance. 
Medicare in Canada is a provincial jurisdiction but the federal government contributes 
financially to Medicare through the CHT. Section 92 of the constitution gives the provinces the 
power over “hospitals” which is broadly interpreted as health-care because, in 1867, health-care 
was provided in only hospitals (Government of Canada 1982). The federal government has so-
called spending power, which allows the federal government to spend its tax revenue wherever it 
wants, including in areas of provincial jurisdiction. Although spending power is unspecified in 
the constitution, there is a broad interpretation that section 36(1) c legitimizes federal spending 
power. Section 36(1) c requires the federal government to ensure Canadians have access to 
essential public services (Richer 2007). Provinces generally view the federal government’s 
spending power as a means to intrude on provincial jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court made it 
clear that the federal spending power is not an intrusion on provincial jurisdiction and the federal 
government is allowed to attach conditions to any transfer it makes to the provinces (Braën 2004; 
Butler and Tiedmann 2013). The difference between the transfer systems in the two countries is 
that Canada’s federal government transfers money to the provinces/territories, where the funds 
finance provincial/territorial Medicare schemes, while Australia’s Commonwealth government 
transfers money to the states to pay for Commonwealth Medicare responsibilities and makes SPP 
through partnerships with the states (Le Goff 2005). Although the Commonwealth government 
in Australia subsidized up to thirty percent of the total cost of private insurance to incentivize 
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citizens to opt for private insurance (Commonwealth Fund 2016), the majority of federal 
healthcare funding supports public healthcare (AIHW 2012). Despite the difference in the 
public-private mix of health care in the two countries, CHT and equalization in Australia are 
comparable because both transfers are the main instruments that the federation used to uphold a 
national standard of Medicare services (Government of Canada 1985; CGC 2015). 
3.2 Historical Institutionalism 
 
This comparative study uses a historical-institutionalism perspective in its examination of 
equalization in Australia and CHT in Canada. Historical-institutionalism attempts to explain how 
institutions form. Historical institutionalists argue that institutions form incrementally over time 
and that institutions sometimes drastically change through radical revolution called punctuated 
equilibrium (Campbell 2004). A historical-institutionalism lens is helpful for policy makers 
because the theory addresses why and how policies change in a given context. Using this theory, 
policy makers can understand how and why Australia designed an NBF, draw lessons from the 
study, and translate that knowledge into a Canadian context. Thus, historical-institutionalism 
provides a foundation for contextualizing the Canadian and Australian transfer systems.6  
Learning from the Australian experience through comparison is the purpose of this 
comparative study. Advantageously, scholars have identified a number of methods in 
transferring policies from one country to another (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Rose 2005; 
Dolowitz 2009). Bennett and Howlett (1992) identify three types of policy-transfer learning: 
government learning, social learning, and lesson drawing. Each type has a different purpose: 
government learning changes governance structure. A change in governance structure could be 
the change in jurisdiction of health-care (i.e. change health-care from a provincial jurisdiction to 
a federal jurisdiction). Social learning examines shifting social paradigms or the ideological shift 
in Canadian values (i.e. a change in how Canadians view their health-care system). Lesson 
drawing concerns the change or adjustment to a policy program while still maintaining the policy 
objective. Among the three types of policy-transfer learning, government and social learning are 
inappropriate methods of learning from the Australian experience. Although Canada and 
                                                 
6 To establish the context, the study uses various sources, ranging from government documents, peer-reviewed 
journal articles, commission reports, and news articles. Government statistics and historical information on transfer 
development come from relevant government websites, and data comes from databases of the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics and Statistics Canada.  
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Australia share many similarities, the two countries are also fundamentally different in division 
of powers and views about their federalism systems. It is not feasible for Canadian policy makers 
to change the jurisdiction of health-care (i.e. division of powers) or to propose a change in values 
towards federalism. Because the CHT is a government program, lesson drawing is an 
appropriate method. Lesson drawing is appropriate because policy makers can learn from the 
experiences of Australia and improve the current CHT to ensure it upholds the values and 
expectations Canadians have of their Medicare system.  
  The comparative study follows a simplified version of the comparative study procedure 
outlined by Rose (2005). Rose’s (2005) book, “Learning from Comparative Public Policy: a 
Practical Guide”, provides a guide for conducting a comparative analysis that draws lessons 
about enacting policy change. The literature on lesson drawing is limited; however, Rose 
provides a useful tool for policy makers interested in lesson drawing. In this study, step one is to 
explore the history of Canada’s federal transfer for Medicare. It examines the context of 
establishing Medicare in Canada and lays out the history of the federal-provincial relationship 
from the end of the Second World War to the 2015 election of the Trudeau Liberal Party. Step 
two reviews the history of Australia’s federal transfer for Medicare. It examines the Australian 
fiscal federalism from federation of Australia in 1901 to the 2015 Commonwealth Grants 
Commission review of equalization. Finally, step three, a summary of step one and two, is to 
compare the Canadian experience and the Australian experience. This step also identifies the 
strongest lesson Canadian policy makers can draw from the Australian experience. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CHT AND AUSTRALIAN EQUALIZATION 
4.1 The Canadian Story 
In a federation, transfers reinforce a sense of nationhood by providing a minimum standard of 
public services (Hertzman 1990). The current federal transfer systems are the results of years of 
incremental changes in both Canada and Australia. Many of these changes are the result of 
negotiations between both levels of government who want to protect the national interest while 
respecting sub-national jurisdiction authority. The Canadian federal transfer system is the 
product of institutional evolution and political decision-making that began with a highly 
collaborative relationship between the federal government and the provinces, to a relationship 
that saw clear divides between federal and provincial roles. Transfers for Canadian Medicare 
underwent three major changes: program inception in 1957, the creation of Established Program 
Financing (EPF) in 1977, and the equal-per-capita formula change in 2014. 
Change in the federal transfer system first occurred after the Second World War, when 
Canadians demanded the restructuring of the country’s social programs, including health-care. 
The Canadian Constitution had given the provinces jurisdiction over Medicare since 
Confederation in 1867, but this constitutional division of powers had its limits, especially given 
that the federal government had major taxation powers in comparison to the provincial 
governments. For example, the federal government accrued the power to tax income during the 
war. With greater financial capabilities, the federal government had the opportunity to shape 
national social policy, while the provincial governments did not. 
In 1946, then Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King called the provincial 
premiers together to formulate a national Medicare scheme, on the condition that the federal 
government retained full control over income taxes and the other tax areas it had appropriated 
during the war (Gray 1991). The western provinces agreed and were prepared to yield tax 
autonomy to gain a national Medicare scheme. Quebec and Ontario, the most populous and 
financially strongest provinces at the time, opposed the perceived federal intrusion on provincial 
autonomy. Despite King’s desire to create a national Medicare scheme, the parliamentary cabinet 
convinced the Prime Minister that Canada should not adopt national Medicare because the 
cabinet believed economic hardships were inevitable after the war. At the end of the First World 
War, Canada went into a deep recession during the Great Depression. The federal cabinet feared 
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a weak economy could return at the end of the Second World War and was therefore not 
interested in spending money on major social programs (Gray 1991). 
The lack of federal leadership, strong opposition from Ontario and Quebec, and lack of 
willingness to institute national Medicare led provinces to act on their own. Beginning in 
Saskatchewan in 1947, the province implemented a universal hospital-services plan called 
Hospitalization. British Columbia adopted the same model in 1949, and Alberta followed suit in 
1950 (Marchildon 2006). Observing the growing public support for national health-care, the 
federal government eventually adopted a national Medicare program in 1957 after intense 
negotiations with Ontario (Gray 1991). To encourage provinces to join the national Medicare 
program, the federal government provided up to 50% of funding for provincial Medicare 
schemes, and the arrangement lasted until 1977. One by one, the provinces joined in the cost-
sharing mechanism, with Quebec being the last to join in 1961. Quebec’s resistance to federal 
interference in areas of provincial jurisdiction quieted when the Liberals gained power in Quebec 
at the beginning of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s. Quebec opted out of the national scheme, 
but received cost-sharing funding from the federal government. Federal funding remained 
because Quebec met minimum federal standards on providing Quebecers access to medically 
necessary services and the federal government wanted to ensure a minimum national standard of 
Medicare. This option was available to other provinces, but only Quebec used this course of 
action to demonstrate its provincial autonomy (Lecours and Béland 2009). 
By 1977, Canada had a national Medicare scheme jointly funded by the federal and 
provincial governments, with each jurisdiction equally funding Medicare in the provinces. 
However, rapidly increasing Medicare costs concerned both levels of government. The federal 
government, at the time led by Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals, argued the ideal method of decreasing 
the federal costs for Medicare was to abandon cost-sharing transfers in favour of block cash 
grants (Gray 1991). The provinces unanimously opposed the federal government’s 
recommendations. Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta agreed with reducing the federal role in 
Medicare, and argued for tax room, claiming the federal government had fulfilled its role of 
establishing a national program and if provided tax room, provinces would be capable of dealing 
with their own constitutional jurisdictions. British Columbia opposed the change for fear of 
budget caps, whereas Saskatchewan saw the withdrawal of federal contribution as a threat to 
national standards. The compromise was a block transfer that included half tax-points transfer 
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and half cash transfer under a new program called Established Programs Financing (Telford 
2003). The cash portion of Established Programs Financing (EPF) was indexed to growth in the 
Canadian economy. The tax-point portion was a fixed thirteen and a half percent of personal 
income tax and one percent of corporate income tax collected from a province/territory and 
allocated from the federal government to the province/territory. The government distributed the 
total EPF on an equal-per-capita total tax point plus cash basis, which meant wealthier provinces 
received less cash transfer on a per capita basis. This compromise was an attempt to balance the 
federation so that less wealthy provinces received more in cash transfer than wealthy provinces 
on a per capita basis. The result of this policy change was a reduction of federal power over 
income taxation, giving the provinces more autonomy over their own source revenue and 
spending in provincial jurisdictions, including Medicare. Despite the change in form of federal 
funding, the existence of the redistributive cash transfer helped preserve a minimum national 
standard in Medicare. 
Through EPF in the 1970s, the federal government found a way to contain its ballooning 
cost of Medicare. The provinces also looked for ways to control their own costs and many settled 
on implementing user fees. Medical professionals, labour unions, and Canadian citizens, 
however, opposed user fees because of what they perceived to be the deterioration of universal 
Medicare. The 1980 Hall Report criticized the user fees as contradictory to the principles of 
Medicare, which gave the federal government political ammunition to blame the provinces for 
eroding Canada’s national standard in Medicare (Gray 1991). The report claimed Canadians 
wanted a universal health system free at the point of use. In turn, the federal government passed 
the Canada Health Act in 1984, enshrining the five principles of Medicare, which became 
federal conditions provinces had to meet to receive EPF. Shortly after its passage, the provinces 
slowly removed user fees. The introduction of EPF and the CHA demonstrated two major shifts 
in the federal transfer system. First, the federal government desired to remove itself from a costly 
Medicare scheme, leaving the provinces to manage costs. Second, the federal government, with 
the support of Canadians, became a protectorate of national Medicare by using financial 
incentives. 
In 1995, the federal government scaled back its transfer spending and changed EPF into 
the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) (Rangarajan and Srivastava 2004). This change 
was different from the change in the 1970s. In 1977, the federal government changed from cost 
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sharing to block funding without decreasing the total amount of cash transfer. In 1995, block 
funding remained for the CHST, but total cash transfers endured cuts. The provinces claimed the 
federal government balanced its books by exploiting the provinces (Madore 1997). Tensions 
were high between the two levels of government and the provinces claimed a substantial vertical 
fiscal gap existed, but the federal government denied any gap (COF 2006).  
The cut to federal health and social transfers caused major tensions between the federal 
government and the provinces and Canadians worried about the future of their Medicare system. 
Alberta challenged the national standard of Medicare when Alberta imposed user fees on out- of-
hospital diagnostic services. The federal government threatened to withhold CHST funding to 
Alberta if it did not remove user fees. The province did not comply with the federal 
government’s requests until 1998 when public outcry against user fees persuaded the Alberta 
government to reverse its policy (Gray 1991). Although the federal government was unable to 
uphold the national standard through financial leveraging, the people of Alberta successfully 
upheld the national standard by demanding their Medicare system remain universally available to 
all citizens regardless of ability to pay.  
The tensions felt by the people in Alberta spread across Canada and Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien called for a royal commission on health. The report of the commission called Building 
on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada (i.e. the Romanow Commission report) clearly 
demonstrated that Canadians wanted to preserve their national Medicare system based on equity, 
fairness, and need. The report’s findings coincided with the 1980 Hall report and showed that 
Canadians continued to value the same principles of Medicare. The commission highlighted that 
Canadians viewed their Medicare system as a right of citizenship and emphasized the strong 
desire to keep the system public. Canadians wanted to keep their Medicare system public 
because Canadians view Medicare as superior to the United States health-care system. In terms 
of federal funding arrangements, the commission recommended that the CHST be split into a 
single health transfer (i.e. the Canada Health Transfer) and a single social transfer (i.e. the 
Canada Social Transfer). The commission also suggested that the federal government provide 
stability in funding and recommended a new formula that guaranteed approximately twenty-five 
percent of total Medicare spending, with a fixed escalator. The Commission implied a needs-
based formula be used when it stated the federal government should consider the expenditure 
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costs of Medicare, but the commission did not make a specific recommendation on how to 
allocate federal dollars on the basis of need.7  
The commission’s work led to the First Ministers (the premiers of the ten provinces and 
then Prime Minister Paul Martin) to meet in 2003 and discuss a national strategy on securing 
Canadian Medicare. The governments agreed in principle to safeguard Medicare for Canadians.  
The ministers did not incorporate most of the Romanow Commission’s recommendations save 
for the splitting of the CHST into the CHT and CST, and establishing a predictable and stable 
total funding for the CHT using a six percent escalator. The ministers focussed on tackling wait 
times and increasing the supply of medical providers in Canada. The ministers believed that 
increased funding would improve Medicare and the federal government committed forty-one 
billion dollars over ten years in new funding to the provinces. The federal and provincial 
governments were not interested in debating tax allocations possibly because of the importance 
placed on injecting new funding into Medicare.  
Prime Minister Paul Martin and the ten premiers signed a ten-year accord in 2004 to 
improve Medicare for Canada (CICS 2004). The funding formula for the new CHT did not 
change because the federal government recognized the importance of including tax points in the 
formula. The federal government argued that tax points were important to the CHT because the 
federal government respected the provinces autonomy – tax points allowed provinces to spend 
raised revenue on provincial priorities.  The federal government further argued that the tax points 
were important in recognizing Quebec’s asymmetric position on Medicare (i.e. Quebec wanted 
more autonomy and tax points allowed for a more autonomy) and the system of tax points and 
cash transfer was a mutually acceptable system (Health Canada 2004). Although the provinces 
largely welcomed the injection of federal transfers to Medicare, increased funding did not 
achieve all the outcomes that the accord was supposed to achieve. In a progress report issued in 
2013, the Health Council of Canada gave a scathing review of the government’s plan to reduce 
wait times and concluded that the results were unclear and overall wait times did not go down 
but remained on a small incline (HCC 2013). The report suggests that the efforts of the federal 
and provincial governments to address specific Medicare issues did not produce positive 
outcomes (i.e. a reduction in wait times). Although the ministers claimed they would work 
                                                 
7 The commission made forty-seven recommendations. The boldest of recommendations were to expand the scope 
of Medicare to include home care services and a national prescription drug plan.  
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toward a national prescription drug plan, and look into introducing home care into Medicare, 
governments did not act and Medicare remains confined to hospital and physician services.  
While the provinces met with the federal government to discuss the ten-year health 
accord, the provinces also established the Council of the Federation in 2003. The Council of the 
Federation (COF) is a body composed of all provincial and territorial premiers without 
representation from the federal government. COF’s initial goal was to find methods of fixing 
Medicare (Collins 2011). The COF achieved major milestones such as the national agreement on 
drug pricing whereby the provinces negotiate as a block with major pharmaceuticals on drug 
pricing. Although each province retains its own drug formulary, the collective action by the 
provinces on drug pricing has demonstrated a potential for the provinces to collaborate on 
Medicare issues.  
On the other hand, during the period from 2004 to 2007, the tensions over equalization 
entitlements reached new heights. The federal government achieved budgetary surplus and the 
provinces believed the federal government had done so by cutting transfers to the provinces. The 
provinces and the federal government agreed to change the equalization formula to alleviate the 
political tensions between the governments. In 2006, the Council of the Federation (COF) 
commissioned a study to examine the “fiscal imbalance” in Canada (COF 2006). The committee 
based its findings on the principles of transparency, accountability, adequacy, predictability, 
equity, and fairness. The panel recommended a new formula for equalization to provide stability. 
The panel also recommended avoiding bi-lateral agreements like the offshore agreements 
between the federal government and the province of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia (COF 
2006). In addition to addressing equalization, the panel recommended the CHT and CST be 
allocated on an equal-per-capita cash transfer only basis. By recommending the CHT and CST 
be distributed on an equal-per-capita cash basis, the advisory panel felt that the allocation 
process would be highly transparent and predictable. Furthermore, the panel recommended 
dropping tax-point transfers to avoid the confusing process of calculating tax-point transfers and 
cash transfers for CHT and CST.  
Shortly after the COF commissioned the report, the Conservative Party led by Stephen 
Harper gained power and pledged to end the vertical fiscal gap by working with the provinces to 
rebalance the federation. In 2007, Stephen Harper’s government promised to fulfill the 
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recommendation of the COF report on allocating the CHT.8 Starting in 2014, the CHT changed 
to an equal-per-capita cash allocation and dropped the tax-point transfers. The Conservative 
government took a different approach to federalism and unilaterally changed the CHT without 
consulting the provinces and territories. The change stood as a contradiction to the precedent set 
by the Liberal government in 2004 when it worked collaboratively with the provinces on the 
health accord. The implications of this change to equal-per-capita allocation meant that less 
affluent provinces received less funding. Under the old CHT formula, a residual equalization 
existed which entitled provinces with lower-than-average provincial income to receive more cash 
transfer on a per capita basis. The new CHT formula dropped residual equalization. The change 
to the CHT formula and a lack of adjustment to equalization made it more difficult for less 
wealthy provinces to provide comparable Medicare services (Marchildon and Mou 2014). The 
change in 2014 reveals a diminished role of the federal government in Medicare, resulting in a 
shift of federal-provincial Medicare relations where the provinces increased autonomy in dealing 
with Medicare and the federal government assumed a minor role.  
Another change to the CHT announced by the Harper governments is an adjustment to 
the annual escalator of the total federal budget for CHT. The ten-year accord committed the 
federal government to increase CHT funding by six percent annually, which sustained its role in 
securing a national standard. Starting in 2017, the annual increase will change from six percent 
escalator to the indexed growth in the economy or a minimum of three percent. The change 
meant the federal contribution to the total budget for Medicare is likely to decrease over time 
given the fact that Medicare cost grows faster than the economy. Although the total CHT 
continues to increase annually, as a percentage of the total cost of Medicare, the CHT is 
shrinking, which means the federal government has level fiscal leveraging in Medicare. If the 
federal government’s share of the Medicare cost continues to decrease, provinces are less likely 
to adhere to the conditions of the CHT because the federal government’s withholding of funding 
has less impact.  
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the changes in the federal health transfer formula over 
time. The table illustrates how the federal and provincial governments shared the burden of 
Medicare and collaborated towards a national system, while respecting provincial autonomy. The 
                                                 
8 The government delayed changes to the CHT until 2014 because the health accord signed by the federal 
government and the provinces in 2004 did not expire until ten years later. 
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table also reveals how federal and provincial governments eventually drifted apart when the 
federal funding mechanism changed from cost sharing to both cash and tax transfers, arriving at 
a cash-only contribution. 
Table 4.1 History of Allocation Formulae for Federal Transfers for Medicare in Canada 
 1957-1976 1977-1995 1996-2003 2004-2013 2014-
Present 
Program 
name 
Hospital Insurance 
and Medicare 
EPF CHST CHT CHT 
Allocation 
formula 
50/50 cost sharing 
between federal and 
provincial/territorial 
governments  
Equal-per-
capita total 
cash and 
tax-point 
transfer 
Equal-per-
capita total 
cash and 
tax-point 
transfer 
Equal-per-
capita total 
cash and 
tax-point 
transfer 
Equal-per-
capita cash 
transfer 
 
The story of Canada’s health-transfer changes reveals a combination of political action 
and inaction, as well as long-standing institutional constraint. The federal government initially 
resisted national Medicare because of interest in dominating income taxation powers and staving 
off a perceived post-war depression. Meanwhile, political pressure from Canadians placed 
provinces in a difficult position because they could not fund demands for Medicare without 
additional aid. The federal-provincial partnership allowed provinces to meet Canadians’ 
demands and retain autonomy over Medicare.  
The establishment of EPF demonstrated the federal government could change its funding 
schemes despite provincial objection. Although EPF was a compromise system, the change from 
cost sharing demonstrated the federal government’s substantial financial power. The federal 
government was able to reduce its ballooning financial burden without fear of reprisal because 
total federal contribution did not decrease. Provinces did not welcome the CHST in 1995 
because the federal government drastically cut transfers. The ten-year health accord was a 
welcomed change by the provinces and the federal government. Both governments were satisfied 
that they could work together to improve Medicare. However, the results of the influx of new 
federal funding did not yield the results the governments desired over the ten-year period. . 
Although total funding for CHT increased, the CHT allocation formula did not change in 2004 
because the federal government believed the tax points and cash contributions were acceptable to 
the provinces and therefore did not want to change the status quo, and there were no specific 
recommendations to adopt the needs-based approach in the Romanow Commission. The change 
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in 2014 to an equal-per-capita formula, removing the tax-point transfer, is the final piece in the 
story of the federal government’s slow withdrawal from the Medicare arena. Although the CHT 
budget continues to rise, federal contribution is low and declining when it comes to total 
spending on Medicare. This slow decline diminishes the ideal of the federal government in 
upholding the national standard of Medicare and puts further pressure on less affluent provinces 
to meet Medicare needs.  
The gradually diminishing role of the federal government in Medicare is not consistent 
with the expectations Canadians have of their Medicare system. Canadians expect their 
provincial and federal governments to work together to preserve Medicare for all Canadians. The 
Canadian Medical Association revealed in 2016 that Canadians prioritize national Medicare 
above other social programs (Canadian Medical Association 2016). Current Canadian attitudes 
on Medicare confirm the points made by the Romanow Commission over a decade ago. 
Canadians still view their Medicare system as a national symbol of citizenship and want their 
governments to work together to preserve it, however, Canadians are not optimistic the federal 
and provincial governments will make substantial change to Medicare (Canadian Medical 
Association 2016). Currently, there is interest in invigorate a collaborative relationship between 
the federal government and the provinces. The federal Liberal party pledged during the election 
of 2015 that it would negotiate a new health accord with the provinces (LPC 2015). The 
provinces have largely welcomed the federal government’s interest in Medicare, and the 
provinces of Ontario and Quebec have called upon the federal government to amend the CHT to 
consider age as a need indicator. Beyond funding allocations, the provinces and federal 
government have not specified what a new health accord could look like, however negotiations 
are slated for the fall of 2016 (McGregor 2016). 
4.2 The Australian Story 
Whereas Canada developed into a highly decentralized federation over time, Australia has 
evolved into a highly centralized federation. Fiscal federalism, punctuated by major events, 
evolved gradually in Australia, setting the country on a path towards centralization and strong 
cooperation between the Commonwealth (the national government) and state governments (sub-
national governments). The major events signalling Australia’s drive towards centralization and 
collaborative federalism were the establishment of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, the 
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Uniform Tax Act, “new federalism,” the introduction of the Goods-and-Services Tax (GST), and 
the establishment of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).  
The major fiscal disparities in Australia are similar to those in Canada today. For 
example, geographical dispersion of population varies greatly across states, as shown in Table 
4.2.  
Table 4.2 Distribution of Population in Australia in 2012 
State/Territory  Total 
Population 
Percentage of 
Remote 
Population 
Percentage of 
Population 
over age 65 
New South Wales 7,290,345 1.0% 16% 
Victoria 6,623,492 0.0% 13% 
Queensland 4,560,059 3.0% 14% 
Western Australia 2,430,252 7.0% 14% 
South Australia 1,654,778 4.0% 18% 
Tasmania 512,019 2.0% 18% 
Northern 
Territory 
234,836 44.0% 7% 
Source: Australian Bureau Statistics 2015 
When the six Australian states confederated in 1901, they quickly recognized major fiscal 
disparities existed across states and called on the Commonwealth to act.  The Commonwealth 
government decided to transfer three-quarters of its raised general revenue to the states through a 
single equal-per capita transfer.9 The states of Western Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania 
complained the equal-per-capita transfer was insufficient to meet their financial needs and that 
confederation created more economic problems for them than did being independent. The 
Commonwealth abandoned the equal-per capita formula in 1910 and instead allocated funds to 
poorer states (claimant states) based on demonstrated fiscal needs (CGC 1995). Richer states (i.e. 
non-claimant states) did not receive Commonwealth funds. The Commonwealth believed that the 
fiscal deficiency of the claimant states would disappear over time and therefore sought 
temporary solutions to a perceived temporary problem.  
                                                 
9 The equal-per capita transfer is not to be confused with equalization. Equalization did not come into existence until 
1933 when the Commonwealth Grants Commission determined its allocation based on need. 
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To meet state fiscal demands, the Commonwealth appointed committees to allocate funds 
to the states. States appointed their own committees to lobby the Commonwealth committees for 
funding. State committees would argue that they could not provide necessary public services 
because they did not have sufficient revenue (Clemens and Velduis 2013). The process was ad 
hoc, and did not satisfy the states because the states believed the Commonwealth committees 
made biased decisions (Collins 2011). 
The ad hoc process ended when Western Australia threatened secession, and the 
Commonwealth agreed to an independent commission responsible for grant allocations. Western 
Australia believed that joining in union with the other Australian states caused fiscal disparities. 
Western Australia believed federal transfers were insufficient to meet state demands and decided 
that Western Australia would be economically stronger if remaining outside the Australian 
union. The Commonwealth convinced Western Australia to stay in the union and promised a 
renewed effort to promote the interests of Western Australia and to appoint an independent 
commission responsible for meeting state needs. The union was preserved, and the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) was created in 1933 (CGC 1995). The 
Commonwealth Grants Commission was satisfactory to Western Australia and other states 
because the CGC was impartial and made its recommendations without Commonwealth political 
input.  
The CGC became the independent arbiter responsible for the allocation of the new 
unconditional transfer called Equalization. The Commonwealth Grants Commission methods 
were intended to “ensure that a claimant State had the financial capacity to provide the same 
range and quality of services as the standard States, as long as it imposed the same range of taxes 
and charges at the same rates as the standard States” (CGC 1995, xiv). A claimant state was a 
recipient of federal transfers. The standard states were the two richest Australian states, New 
South Wales and Victoria (CGC 1995). Wealthy states were not claimant states and therefore did 
not receive transfers (the situation is the same in Canada whereby provinces that are more 
affluent do not receive equalization payments). Adhering to this principle ensured a vertically 
equitable approach to financial management and the preservation of the federation. 
The preservation of the federation in 1933 created stability in Australia, but the Second 
World War challenged the stability. The Uniform Tax Act, passed in 1942 (amended in 1976), 
marked a watershed moment when the Commonwealth assumed major financial power over all 
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income taxes. Prior to the Uniform Tax Act 1942, the Commonwealth and state governments 
jointly collected income taxes. The Uniform Tax Act 1942 allowed the Commonwealth to be the 
sole collector of income taxes. The states challenged the constitutional validity of the Uniform 
Tax Act and appealed to the Australian High Court for legal interpretation. The High Court ruled 
the Uniform Tax Act legitimate in 1942, granting the Commonwealth power to collect income 
taxes and transfer revenue to the states using grants. The High Court cited Section 96 of the 
Constitution whereby the Commonwealth could make any grant it wished to the states, provided 
the states accept the grant (Twomey and Carling 2014). The shift in tax allocation meant the 
Commonwealth collected the majority of tax revenue, while states had access to smaller tax 
bases such as stamp and land taxes. The revenues collected by the Commonwealth outweighed 
its expenditure need, while state tax revenue was insufficient to meet the growing expenditure 
need. The court ruling meant states became dependent on Commonwealth government grants. 
State dependence on Commonwealth grants meant states had to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth was able to exert its power in areas of state jurisdiction 
for the purposes of advancing national interest. The watershed moment of passing Uniform Tax 
Act thus set up a path towards a collaborative relationship between the Commonwealth and the 
state governments because this was a relationship of necessity given that the states were 
dependent on Commonwealth grants. 
By 1946, the Commonwealth collected over eighty percent of all tax revenue but was 
responsible for fifty percent expenditure needs (Dollery 2001). In 1946, the Commonwealth 
further expanded its expenditure role by assuming more responsibility for social programs, 
including hospital insurance and pharmaceuticals (which became Medicare), and pensions (Gray 
1991). In 1946, a national referendum occurred because Victoria challenged the Commonwealth 
government when the Commonwealth established a national pharmaceutical benefit scheme. 
Under the scheme, the Commonwealth government would provide free medicines from licensed 
pharmacists. Victoria challenged the legislation claiming the Commonwealth was intruding on 
state jurisdiction. The High Court could not agree on a ruling. The Commonwealth acted by 
asking the Australian people through a referendum if pharmaceutical benefits should be a 
Commonwealth jurisdiction or a state jurisdiction. Australians voted in favour of the 
Commonwealth government and section 51 became part of the constitution (Gray 1991). The 
 47 
referendum gave the Commonwealth legitimacy to advance the national interest and accrue more 
responsibility for health-care. 
The Second World War and the period after the war allowed the Commonwealth to retain 
tax power and shift the country further towards centralization. Over time, however, subsequent 
Liberal governments challenged the balance. The defeat of the Whitlam Labor Government by 
the Liberal Fraser Government in 1975 marked an important change in Australian federalism, in 
which the Commonwealth adopted  “new federalism”  (Saunders and Wiltshire 1980).10 New 
federalism argued that the role of government was too large and had been increasing since the 
Whitlam Government in the 1960s (Dollery 2001). The Liberal Fraser Government’s ideology 
was to cut government spending through privatization of health-care and other social services. 
Privatizing areas of health-care across Australia was possible because the Commonwealth 
controlled major areas of health-care and therefore if the Commonwealth changed its health-care 
policy, it affected the entire country. Whereas, if a state like Victoria changed its policy on 
health-care, it would only affect Victoria. Australian Medicare was also a new program 
(introduced in 1974) and citizens had not firmly accepted that health-care had to be public.  As a 
result, the Fraser government was able to introduce private health insurance in 1975 without 
major political upheaval (Gray 1991).  
With the partial privatization of health-care in 1975, the Fraser Liberal government 
opposed the previous Whitlam Labor government’s public approach to health-care. The Fraser 
Liberal government introduced privately run hospitals, private physician services, and a special 
income tax levy. A two percent levy was to be paid by all Australians in the top income tax 
bracket who did not purchase private health insurance (i.e. part of the “carrot and stick” method 
to encourage wealthy Australians to purchase private insurance). The levy caused political 
tensions between the Commonwealth and the states because the revenue from the levy went to 
the Commonwealth government. The states argued that because they had partial claim on income 
tax revenue, they also had a claim on part of the levy. The Commonwealth disagreed and 
continued to collect the full levy (Saunders and Wiltshire 1980; Wallack and Srinivasan 2011. 
122).  
                                                 
10 The Liberal Party of Australia is politically unaligned with the Liberal Party of Canada. In Australia, the Liberal 
Party is highly conservative, whereas the Labor Party is socially liberal. 
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In addition to the Fraser government’s ambitions to privatize health-care, the government 
also took a new approach to fiscal federalism. The government introduced the States (Personal 
Income Tax Sharing) Agreement Act 1978, and the Commonwealth transferred a fixed 39.87% of 
the personal income tax to the states through the new equalization transfer, in exchange for 
reducing Specific Purpose Payments (SPP) by an equal value (Wallack and Srinivasan 2011, 
122-123).11 In addition, all states became eligible for equalization transfers. This major federal-
transfer policy reform demonstrates that a change to one component of the transfer system 
(general-purpose payments like equalization) affects other transfer payments (specific-purpose 
payments like SPP). By expanding the unconditional equalization transfer and constraining the 
conditional SPP transfers, the Commonwealth government emphasized state autonomy and 
wanted to remove itself from state policymaking. The most important change in terms of fiscal 
federalism during the Liberal Party period was the expansion of equalization to include all states. 
Prior to including all states in the formula, more affluent states complained that they were 
transferring funds to the less affluent states (the argument is similar in Canada). When the 
Liberal Party introduced equalization as a pan-Australian transfer including all states, 
equalization became a zero-sum game whereby all states had an interest in getting the most out 
of the Commonwealth budget (Dollery 2001). 
The allocation of equalization among states uses the per capita “relativities” of each state. 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission reviewed equalization relativities and recommended 
how to distribute the new tax revenue to the states. The principles remained the same as those in 
the allocations made under Labor governments. State eligibility was still determined based on its 
demonstrated fiscal capacity to provide public services. However, because all states became 
eligible, using the fiscal capacity of New South Wales and Victoria as standard was no longer 
acceptable; rather, the Commonwealth Grants Commission changed the determination of 
national fiscal capacity to the national average of all states.  
After the Commonwealth transferred equalization based on CGC recommendations and 
simultaneously reduced SPP to the states, state governments were not impressed with the new 
arrangement and some argued the Commonwealth should devolve all income tax revenue to the 
states. The state of New South Wales in particular was vocal arguing that more tax revenue 
                                                 
11“Relativity” is a number reflecting the general strength of a state economy. If a state’s relativity is below one, 
which is the national average, the state receives less equalization transfer, while a state with a greater number than 
one receives more in equalization (CGC, 2015).  
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would be required to meet expenditure need. Other states such as Tasmania argued against the 
devolution of income tax revenue because the value of all income taxes was less in Tasmania 
than in New South Wales (Boothe 1996). States also argued that devolving taxes would create 
further expenditure needs because each state would have to create administrations to collect the 
new tax revenue. However, states welcomed the move of reducing SPP in exchange for 
equalization because states desired more freedom from the Commonwealth government. SPPs 
were conditional while equalization was unconditional. Therefore, states did not have to follow 
Commonwealth guidelines on how to spend equalization, whereas states had to follow 
Commonwealth rules when spending SPP. 
States agreed that unconditional equalization was a better alternative than conditional 
SPP. However, the states and the Commonwealth disagreed on the treatment of SPP and 
equalization when it came to calculation of total entitlements. The Commonwealth argued that 
transfer entitlements were double counted because states received equalization based on need 
(e.g. road deficiencies) but also received SPP for major expenditure projects (e.g. roads). The 
Commonwealth asked the CGC to consider the effects SPP had on equalization entitlements, and 
to reduce equalization by the value of SPP. States argued the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission was an inappropriate body to determine Specific Purpose Payments.12 States further 
argued that the reduction in equalization without adequate compensation meant states had to 
raise their own tax revenues from pay roll, property, and mining. States argued these tax 
revenues were inadequate to meet demands for health-care and other public services (CGC 
1995). The compromise was to reduce equalization entitlements equal to the value of SPP 
received by a state, unless the Commonwealth ordered the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
not to take into account SPP in the calculation of equalization entitlements in certain cases. For 
example, if a state received funds through equalization based on a deficiency in the number of 
roads, but the state also received a Specific Purpose Payments for road improvement, the CGC 
would reduce equalization entitlement by the value of the Specific Purpose Payments for roads. 
However, in some cases, the Commonwealth could counter the CGC’s recommendations if the 
Commonwealth felt an SPP should not be a determinant of equalization entitlements.   
                                                 
12The relativities used by the CGC for equalization transfer were different from the Commonwealth’s SPP 
relativities (Saunders and Wiltshire 1980). 
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 The Labor Party returned to power in 1983 and shifted Australian fiscal federalism again. 
In exchange for reducing SPPs, the Paul Keating Labor Government changed the total budget of 
equalization from 39.87% of personal income revenue, to 39.87% of Commonwealth general 
revenue (CGC 1995). To enshrine political cooperation between the states and the 
Commonwealth, Prime Minister Keating formed the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG). At that time, Australians were dissatisfied with their governments for being unable to 
solve major issues, and the solution adopted was formal cooperation through the Council of 
Australian Governments (CGC 2008). One of the major issues Australians were dissatisfied with 
was health-care. In particular, Australians were not satisfied with the confusing process of 
navigating the health-care system. For example, a typical Australian patient could receive 
treatment from a state provided doctor, transfer to a Commonwealth hospital, and finally receive 
treatment from a private doctor. The process was confusing and Australians demanded better 
coordination and communication. The Commonwealth and state governments pledged to fix 
health-care through collaboration and to set aside jurisdictional debates and see health-care from 
the national interest (COAG 2011).  
In 2000, the last major change to Australian fiscal federalism occurred when the revenue 
source of the equalization transfer changed to 100% of the revenue of the newly introduced 
Goods-and-Services Tax (GST) (Hollander 2008). As a condition of introducing a GST, state 
governments removed small taxes such as stamp taxes, and the Commonwealth government 
removed its wholesale tax system. States were adamant that the Commonwealth was taking away 
tax revenue when it abolished stamp taxes and other smaller tax revenues. The states demanded 
compensation for lost revenue by receiving 100 percent of the GST through the equalization 
transfer. The new, full GST revenue replaced a percentage of general revenue and became the 
only source of funding for equalization. This change of funding source increased the total 
equalization budget substantially. In 1999, the budget for equalization was approximately 
twenty-three billion dollars and one year later, it became approximately thirty-one billion dollars 
(CGC 2008).  
This major tax reform motivated a change of the equalization allocation formula. 
According to the Commonwealth Grants Commission, the change to the GST meant 
Increased attention given to the Commission’s work and related matters such as 
the continued appropriateness of equalisation as a basis for distributing the GST 
revenue, the implications of equalisation for the efficient allocation of resources 
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across the country and the desirability of transparent and simple methods (CGC 
2008, 35).  
 
Following the GST change, the Commonwealth Grants Commission immediately became 
responsible for determining how to allocate the GST revenue through the equalization transfer. 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission changed its methodology of determining equalization 
entitlements and adopted the principle known as full fiscal equalization. Full fiscal equalization 
assesses the fiscal capacity and expenditure need of each state instead of the fiscal need of each 
state. Expenditure need is different from fiscal need because expenditure need looks at the 
various factors affecting the cost of providing public services (i.e. demographics, location, and 
ethnicity), while fiscal need looks at the difference between the revenue raised and the cost of 
providing public services in state budgets. Using fiscal need meant states were able to 
manipulate their spending habits to receive Commonwealth transfers. In order to minimize such 
perverse incentives, the Commonwealth Grants Commission requires that the relativities of fiscal 
capacity and expenditure needs used in the allocation formula must be outside government 
control. Full fiscal equalization ensures that all states have the same capacity to provide services 
and the associated infrastructure at the same standard of efficiency (Clemens and Veldhuis 
2013).  
By giving larger revenue (100 percent of GST) to the states through the equalization 
transfer and reducing SPP from ninety categories to five categories, the Commonwealth granted 
states a large amount of autonomy, since equalization is unconditional while SPP are conditional, 
and GST revenue is substantially larger than SPP grants. In addition, GST revenue is transparent 
because states know where funding comes from, whereas general revenue is not transparent. This 
funding source and the full fiscal equalization allocation formula have been unchanged since the 
GST inception in 2000. However, debates over fiscal federalism continued after 2000 in 
particular when the Labor government proposed to change health-care.  
 In 2008, the Rudd Labor Government attempted to centralize power by proposing the 
Commonwealth assume full control over public health-care. In exchange for assuming full 
spending responsibility for health-care, the Commonwealth suggested the states yield fifteen 
percent of GST revenue, leaving eighty-five percent to the states for equalization payments. The 
Commonwealth also tried to establish National Partnership Programs (another form of SPP) with 
the intention of incentivizing state governments to provide specific services of national interest 
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(Aulich and Evans 2010). State governments, however, perceived the Commonwealth proposal 
for nationalizing health-care as an intrusion on state jurisdiction of health-care and rejected the 
proposal. Because of the rising political tensions between the Rudd Government and state 
governments, the Commonwealth failed to accomplish nationalization of health-care, but many 
National Partnership Programs existed because of COAG negotiations. For example, some 
National Partnership Programs attempt to tackle hospital wait times and improve health 
outcomes (CGC 2015). In addition, the Commonwealth government and states agreed in 2011 to 
tackle diabetes and improve access for cancer treatments (COAG 2011). These successful 
coordination efforts demonstrate that a collaborative approach can work in a federation to 
support the national interest. 
National partnerships are important in coordinating efforts to improve the Australian 
health-care system, and a collaborative approach respects both state jurisdiction and the national 
interest. However, equalization remains the most important means by which the Commonwealth 
government ensures equity in access of public services across Australia. Equalization 
entitlements are determined based on the relativities of the states. The Commonwealth Grants 
Commission uses the following formula to calculate the equalization relativities: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 =(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 – 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 – 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 – 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛) 
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝           (2) 
 
The assessed expenditure is the total assessed expenses of a state plus the assessed 
investment of a state. Assessed expenses are the sum of the expenditures in various expenditure 
categories. Each expenditure category includes a number of need factors called “disabilities” as 
summarized in table 4.3 (CGC 2015). 
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Table 4.3 Expenditure Categories and Applicable Disabilities 
Expenditure Categories Disabilities 
Schools Aboriginal status, remoteness, urban/rural population, non-state 
sector, wage costs, regional costs,  
Post-Secondary Education Aboriginal status, remoteness, age, wage costs, regional costs 
Admitted Patients Aboriginal status, remoteness, age, non-state sector, wage costs,  
Welfare and Housing Aboriginal status, remoteness, age, wage costs, regional costs,  
Services to Communities Aboriginal status, remoteness, wage costs, regional costs 
Justice Services Aboriginal status, age, wage costs, regional costs,  
Roads Urban/rural population, wage costs, regional costs 
Transport Services Urban/rural population, wage costs, regional costs 
Source: CGC (2015) 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission explains the expenditure categories in Table 4.3 
in details (CGC 2015). Schools include spending on government and non-government pre-
schools, primary and secondary schools and student transport services. Post-Secondary education 
includes spending on vocational education training and higher education. The admitted patients 
variable means spending on public hospitals, community, and public health services. Welfare 
and Housing includes spending on social housing and welfare services. The “services to 
communities” variable means spending on utilities (electricity, water, and wastewater). Justice 
services means spending on police, courts, and prisons while roads means spending on road 
maintenance (i.e. repaving, repairing bridges, and tunnels).  
Calculating assessed investments requires four steps. The first step is to find the total 
disabilities affecting the quantity of infrastructure required by a state (d), cost disability for the 
state (cd), population of the state (p), the total value of the Australian infrastructure stocks (K), 
and the total Australian population at the beginning of a given year (P). The second step is to 
determine the same values for each variable at the end of a given year. The third step is to 
compute the assessed investment at the beginning and the end of year respectively by dividing 
(K) by (P) and then multiplying by (d) and (p). In the final step, the assessed investment at the 
beginning of the year is subtracted from the assessed investment at the end of the year and 
multiplied by (cd). The result is the assessed investment (CGC 2015).   
 Assessed net borrowing is the total revenue raised through borrowing at the beginning of 
the year subtracted from the amount borrowed at the end of the year. Assessed revenue is the 
total dollar value the state could raise if it applied the standard tax rate to payroll tax, land tax, 
stamp duty on conveyances, insurance tax, motor tax, and mining revenue. Finally, other 
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Commonwealth grants are the SPP funds allocated to the states for specific purposes. The final 
per capita GST relativity for each state on an annual basis is then calculated according to formula 
(2) above. The important numbers used for the calculation of relativities in 2013-14 are given in 
table 4.4 below.  
 
Table 4.4 The Per-Capita Amounts (AU$) and The GST Relativities in 2013-2014  
States  New South 
Wales  
Victoria  Queensland  Western 
Australia  
South 
Australia 
Tasmania  Northern 
Territory  
Assessed Expenses 8512 8096 9367 9625 9108 9661 18718 
Assessed 
Investment 
383 455 408 585 266 89 646 
Assessed 
Expenditure 
8895 8551 9775 10209 9375 9750 19364 
Assessed Net 
Borrowing 
435 446 441 457 421 406 437 
Assessed Revenue 4851 4458 4902 7921 4145 3677 4918 
Total Requirement 
for Assistance 
3609 3648 4432 1831 4808 5667 14009 
Other 
Commonwealth 
Transfers 
1597 1752 1622 1556 1563 1674 2649 
GST Requirement 2012 1896 2809 275 3246 3993 11360 
Per-Capita 
Relativity 
0.917 0.864 1.280 0.125 1.479 1.819 5.177 
National Average 
GST per capita 2199 2199 2199 2199 2199 2199 2199 
Per-Capita 
Equalization  
($AU) 2016 1899 2814 274 3252 3999 11384 
Total Equalization 
($AU millions) 15363 11497 9991 2962 4719 1807 2861 
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015) 
Table 4.4 shows the data of per capita amount for each component of the relativity 
formula in equation (2) for the fiscal year of 2013-2014. A state’s entitlement is based on its 
relativity to the national average GST entitlement (i.e. in 2013-2014 average GST was $2199 per 
capita). For example, the state of New South Wales has a relativity of 0.917. This means that 
New South Wales is relatively economically strong and/or has a lower expenditure need in 
comparison to the national average (relativity of 1.0). New South Wales is then entitled to 91.7% 
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of the national average GST on a per-capita basis. The Northern Territory has a relativity of 
5.177 and is entitled to 518 percent of the national average GST on a per-capita basis.  
 To illustrate the process the Commonwealth Grants Commission uses to calculate GST 
entitlements, let us take the most recent report the CGC issued in determining equalization for 
Western Australia. In 2015, the Commonwealth Grants Commission undertook its five-year 
review of equalization in order to consider how much GST revenue Western Australia should 
receive. The process involved examining the changes to both revenue and expenditure needs in 
Western Australia from the year 2010 to 2015. On the revenue side, Western Australia benefitted 
from an increase in mining revenue. Western Australia is rich in natural resources and therefore 
its revenue increased substantially over the five-year period. Natural resources exist unequally 
across Australia, which means states like Tasmania did not benefit from an increase in mining 
revenue. If everything else remained unchanged, an increase in mining revenue would mean the 
CGC would reduce Western Australia’s equalization entitlements. According to the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission, Western Australia’s expenditure needs increased because 
of its population growth since 2010, a larger share of the total Australian Aboriginal population, 
and a larger portion of Western Australians living in remote communities. Population growth 
meant an increased burden on public services and therefore the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission considered the growth in population size as affecting expenditure need. Western 
Australia also has a large portion of Australia’s Aboriginal population, many of whom live in 
remote locations. The CGC recognizes the higher cost of providing services in remote locations 
and the increased need of Aboriginal citizens because of their socio-economic status. After 
calculating both revenue and expenditure need, the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
determined the new revenue gained from mining revenue exceeded the burden of an increased 
need for public services for Western Australia. In addition, the CGC did not receive instruction 
from the Commonwealth to disregard any SPP entitlement when determining equalization 
entitlement. This meant the Commonwealth Grants Commission recognized that Western 
Australia’s SPP entitlements had an effect on its equalization entitlements. The CGC’s final 
recommendation for Western Australia was to reduce equalization entitlement for 2015 (CGC 
2015).   
As shown by the needs-based formula described above, the allocation formula for 
equalization in Australia attempts to mitigate the inherent disparities in both revenue and 
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expenditure needs among the states and territories. The “disabilities” indicators for each 
expenditure category (in Table 4.3) are the critical need factors that determine the assessed 
expense, assessed expenditure, and the final per-capita relativity and per-capita equalization 
entitlement of a state.  
As shown in the fourth row of Table 4.3, the needs factors for expenditure category 
“Admitted Patients” (the health-care category) in the equalization formula include age, 
Aboriginal status, remoteness, wage costs, and non-state sector. These need indicators are those 
the CGC regards as policy-neutral indicators of needs (that minimize perverse incentives). 
According to Commonwealth Grants Commission, demographics including age and aboriginal 
status are strong proxy indicators of needs and relate to the uncontrollable expenditure cost of the 
states. This justification is consistent with the theoretical framework outlined in chapter one and 
two, which demonstrates why demographics indicate need and how they are efficient indicators 
because demographics are free of perverse incentives. Australia uses the total population above 
age sixty-five and the total population that identified as Aboriginal as need indicators. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics provides the data of age and Aboriginal status, and the CGC uses 
that data for its calculations and recommendations.  
Remote location is another indicator used in the equalization allocation formula, 
illustrating the increased cost of providing services to those outside major urban centres. The 
Commonwealth Grants Commission argues that location is a policy neutral need indicator 
because the cost of providing public services to those in remote locations is inherently higher 
than providing public services to Australians in urban locations (CGC 2015). The University of 
Adelaide proposed a methodology for allocating resources based on location and designed a tool 
called Accessibility Remoteness Index of Australia (GISCA 2006). The tool allows anyone with 
computer access to find his or her individual geographic location relative to the nearest service 
centre. A service centre is a location that provides public services such as a primary health 
centre, school, or hospital. The Commonwealth Grants Commission uses this transparent tool, 
combined with Australian Bureau of Statistics data on geographic population dispersion, to find 
appropriate allocations of money based on geographic location. Accessibility Remoteness Index 
of Australia is calculated by finding the remoteness (i.e. zero = lowest accessibility to public 
services, fifteen = highest remoteness) of a town dependent on its relative distance to five 
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different categories of service centers.13 The five service locations are determined based on the 
size of population in each location. For example, a category “A” service area has over 250,000 
persons while an “E” category has between 1000 and 4999 persons. Calculating remoteness 
requires finding the distance in kilometres using existing roads from the location in question to 
the nearest six service centers. For example, Pine Creek is in the Northern Territory and is 2,819 
kilometres from its nearest category “A” service centre. Pine Creek is 212 kilometres from its 
category “B” service centre, 212 kilometres from its category C service centre, and 92 kilometres 
from its category “D” service centre. The next step involves dividing each number by the 
national average for each category (i.e. category A = 2,819/418, category B = 212/217, category 
C = 92/84, category D = 92/47). Finally, the Accessibility Remoteness Index is found by 
summing the relative distance index from a location to the five service centers (i.e.3.00 + 0.98 + 
1.61 + 1.10 + 1.96 = 8.65).The result gives the Access and Remoteness Index score which the 
CGC uses to calculate equalization funding (i.e. higher scores mean higher funding).  
Wage costs are calculated by estimating the additional costs of paying for employees 
relative to the national average wage each state would have to pay for the average employee. The 
difference is estimated using an econometric model of private sector employee wages controlling 
for the differences in education, industry, and experience. The Commonwealth Grants 
Commission uses private sector wages because public sector wages are influenced by 
government and are therefore not policy neutral (CGC 2015).  
Non-state sector costs are calculated by finding the number of services provided by both 
the public and private sector (i.e. duplicated services). The CGC estimated in 2015 that 
approximately twenty-eight percent of health-care services were duplicated by the private sector. 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission argues that citizens who use private health-care 
services will not use public health-care services, and therefore reduces equalization entitlements 
by the number of the duplicated services (CGC 2015).  
Referring to the theoretical framework identified in Chapter two, the Australian 
equalization formula is a mixture of both need and non-need indicators. The need indicators are 
age and Aboriginal status. The non-need indicators are remoteness, wage costs, and non-state 
                                                 
13 The highest Access and Remoteness Index each region can have is fifteen and because there are five categories, 
the highest value each category can have is three. 
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sector. These indicators are non-needs because they are associated with the cost of providing 
public services rather than reflecting amount of services deemed medically necessary.  
The two need indicators (age and Aboriginal status) meet the criteria of equity and 
efficiency as both are empirically linked with need for public services (equity) and cannot be 
manipulated (i.e. efficient, free of perverse incentive).  
Wage costs meet equity criteria because all Australians have the right to access public 
services regardless of their location, therefore government should provide the necessary 
compensation for employees providing public services regardless of location. Wage costs meet 
the criteria of efficiency because wage costs are determined by location of service provision. The 
government cannot control the cost of providing services to remote locations due to local wage 
rate, which means in terms of government policy, wage costs generate little perverse incentive.  
In addition, the CGC uses the average private sector wages, controlling for education, industry, 
and experience factors, when determining the wage costs of each state. This step means the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission keeps wage costs policy neutral because state governments 
do not have as much influence over private sector wages as they do on public sector wages.  
The non-state sector indicator is equitable because states are required to provide citizens 
access to a number of public services while some states have prominent private sectors that 
provide duplicate services. The CGC recognizes that some states cannot offer non-state services 
(i.e. large remote populations) and therefore the services have to be provided by the state. 
Therefore, it is fair for the CGC to recognize the impact of the non-state sector in allocating GST 
revenues. The non-state indicator is also efficient because the inclusion of this variable in the 
formula produces little perverse incentives. For example, if New South Wales has a thriving non-
state sector providing physiotherapy services, New South Wales will not receive all the funding 
for physiotherapy services. There is no incentive for New South Wales to provide more public 
physiotherapy services in order to receive more funding because providing the public services 
will cost the same amount of resources as the potential additional transfer. However, a state like 
the Northern Territory has a high remote population and a largely absent non-state sector that 
could provide physiotherapy services. In this case, the state should receive more in funding 
because the Northern Territory is forced to provide the service through the public sector (CGC 
2015).  
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Finally, remoteness of population is non-need but the variable could be justified because 
it seeks to promote equitable access to public services. In addition, remoteness could arguably be 
efficient because it is difficult to manipulate geographical location of population. The 
consideration of location is integral to the territories of Australia. Like Canada, Australia’s 
territorial population is remote and is comprised of a majority of Aboriginal peoples. Taking 
remoteness of location into consideration ensures an equitable allocation of funding to the 
territories. Remoteness of location is included in the equalization formula in Australia also 
because the territories do not receive special transfers based on remoteness as in Canada 
(Territorial Formula Financing in Canada), so double counting of needs is a not an issue. In 
addition, the formula for the total equalization received by the states and territories removes 
other Commonwealth grants to ensure the equalization transfer does not double count the already 
existing SPP.  
 
Table 4.5 Full Fiscal Equalization vs. Equal-per-capita Formula in 2015 (millions $) 
State Full-Fiscal-
Equalization 
Formula 
Equal-per-capita 
Formula 
Redistribution 
(=Col.1-Col.2) 
New South Wales 17,311 18,200 -899 
Victoria 12,755 14,234 -1,479 
Queensland 13,046 11,525 1,521 
Western Australia 1,935 6,425 -4,490 
South Australia 5,525 4,050 1,475 
Tasmania 2,236 1,224 1,012 
Northern Territory 3,351 599 2,752 
 
Table 4.5 shows the impact of the needs-based equalization formula against the 
benchmark, equal-per-capita distribution. As described before, the needs-based full fiscal 
equalization formula determines the relativities and equalization entitlements of states based on 
their relative population size, revenue capacity, and expenditure needs. An equal-per-capita 
formula (like the one for CHT allocation after 2014) determines the equalization entitlements of 
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states based on only their relative population size. Compared with an equal-per-capita allocation, 
the full-fiscal-equalization principle produces winners and losers. New South Wales, Victoria, 
and Western Australia lose under the full-fiscal-equalization formula, while Queensland, South 
Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern Territory gain through the full fiscal equalization. 
Through this inter-state redistribution, equalization is integral to upholding the national unity and 
maintains a sense of nationalism in Australia. Western Australia provides a good example of the 
importance of equalization because Western Australia was for decades a relatively poor state. 
Recall that Western Australia threatened cessation because the Commonwealth would not meet 
its needs. Today, Western Australia is one of the most fiscally strong Australian states (and 
therefore a contributing state in equalization). However Western Australia remains adamant that 
equalization should keep the principles of full horizontal equalization because it recognizes the  
same fiscal challenge to the other states that Western Australia faced in its past. Western 
Australia, like the other states, is committed to the principle of equity and ensuring that 
Australians have the same standard of public services (CGC 2015). In addition, regional divides 
are less important in Australia than in Canada, which means Australian states are willing to 
accept assisting poorer states if assisting the states means protecting the national interest.  
Full fiscal equalization based NBF is politically feasible in Australia because the country 
is committed to achieving full horizontal and vertical equity and because the CGC is an 
independent arbiter for the states, thus diffusing political tension between the Commonwealth 
and state governments. Through the Commonwealth Grants Commission, the Australian 
governments agree to the principles of full fiscal equalization and balance equity and efficiency. 
Each variable included in the current NBF for the equalization transfer has undergone intense 
scrutiny by the Commonwealth and the state governments. For example, in calculating the 
influence of non-state health-care on equalization, the CGC calculated in 2015 that 
approximately twenty-eight percent of health-care services were duplicated (i.e. provided by 
both the public and private sector). The Commonwealth Grants Commission recommended that 
the cost of these duplicates services be deducted from equalization when determining 
equalization entitlements. South Australia disagreed and argued the number of private health-
care services varied across Australia and South Australia did not have as large a private sector as 
other states. South Australia was a lone voice in opposition to the CGC’s recommendations and 
therefore did not influence the CGC’s final recommendation (CGC 2015).This demonstrates that, 
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through research and negotiations, Australia has been able to find a balance between equity and 
efficiency within its country’s own context, to create a feasible NBF.  
Table 4.6 summarizes the history of equalization in Australia. Initially, transfers helped 
cover a claimant (relatively poor) state’s budgetary deficiencies. Funding to alleviate these 
deficiencies came from the general revenue of the Commonwealth. Transfers changed under the 
Fraser Government where personal income tax became the source of transfer funding, and 
instead of only poor states being eligible for equalization, all states became eligible. The year 
2000 brought the GST revenue, the new major source of funding for equalization, and the 
adoption of the full fiscal equalization principles of the transfer system, whereby states received 
funds based on revenue and expenditure deficiencies outside state control. The change to full 
fiscal equalization meant Australia adopted an NBF that upheld the equity principle of meeting 
state expenditure and revenue needs, while recognizing efficiency concerns.  
Table 4.6 History of Equalization in Australia 
 1933-1978 1979-1999 2000-Present 
Program name Equalization Equalization Equalization 
Source funding The portion of general 
revenue needed to 
meet budget 
deficiencies of 
claimant states  
39.87% of the 
personal income tax 
revenue, and later a 
percentage of total 
general revenue 
100% of the GST 
revenue 
Objective Ensure sufficient 
revenues to provide 
the average standard 
of services 
Ensure sufficient 
revenues to provide 
the average standard 
of services 
Ensure sufficient 
revenues to provide 
the average standard 
of services at the same 
level of efficiency  
Allocation formula Based on budgetary 
deficiencies of 
claimant states14 
Based on per capita 
“relativities”15 
Full fiscal 
equalization  
Recipient Claimant states All states All states 
  
                                                 
14 Revenue of a state calculates as the amount a claimant state could have raised if its tax rate was the same as the 
average of the non-claimant states subtracted from its actual tax revenue. State expenditure is the unit cost of social 
services in a claimant state multiplied by the number of units in a claimant state.  
15 As a result of all states becoming eligible for equalization the formula changed to: standardized expenditure 
(standard expenditure plus the relative expenditure need in comparison with the other states) subtracted from its 
standardized revenue (standard revenue subtract its relative revenue needs in comparison with the other states) 
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4.3 Comparing Canada and Australia to Draw Lessons 
There are more differences than similarities between the history of the Canadian and Australian 
federal health transfer systems. A major divide between the two federations occurred at the end 
of the Second World War when the two countries chose separate paths to deal with fiscal 
federalism. Canada addressed the vertical fiscal gap through transfers and tax allocations, and 
Australia just used transfers. The federal government of Canada reduced its taxation power and 
allowed the provinces to collect their own tax revenue to pay for public services, while 
Australia’s Commonwealth government retained fiscal power because of the Uniform Tax Act 
1942. In terms of addressing horizontal fiscal gaps among provinces/states in the area of health-
care, Canada equalizes provincial fiscal capacity through the equalization program and ignores 
differences in expenditure needs in the equalization program or the CHT and their predecessors. 
From the beginning of the equalization program in 1933 to today, Australia equalizes based on 
both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs through the equalization transfer and attempts to 
uphold national standards and the national interest through equalization.   
Because Australian states and the Commonwealth recognized that poorer states had poor 
fiscal capacity to meet their expenditure needs, the states and Commonwealth agreed to mitigate 
these differences through an NBF. In addition, the High Court ruling on the Uniform Tax Act in 
1942 allowed the Commonwealth to retain fiscal power over the states, making the states 
dependent on Commonwealth grants. The Uniform Tax Act in 1942 and the High Court ruling 
gave the Commonwealth considerable financial power, which necessitated the CGC to ensure a 
fair allocation of Commonwealth grants. Although most states preferred tax room to special 
grants, states were confident the Commonwealth Grants Commission would represent their 
interests to meet their needs and, thereby, went along with using the NBF developed by the 
CGC. In addition, the states believed in the principle of full fiscal equalization, which meant the 
states could agree to ensure the needs of all Australians would be met. Therefore, Australia 
adopted and maintained an NBF because of the fiscal power of the Commonwealth government, 
the presence of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, state commitment to full fiscal 
equalization, and the resulting strong degree of political cooperation between the Commonwealth 
and the states.  
Finally, there is the presence of the Council of Australian Governments a formal 
institution dedicated to ensuring all governments work together towards the national interest of 
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Australia (Warhurst 2007). The formal institution of COAG solidified an existing relationship 
whereby the Commonwealth and states could work together to address national issues and 
maintain a strong collaborative relationship. These events formed a context where Australia 
could adopt and maintain a needs-based approach for its equalization transfer system.   
Australia adopted the needs-based approach in the early years of federation, while the 
Canadian federal government was less concerned with reshaping fiscal federalism and more 
concerned with staving off another recession after the Second World War. The federal 
government in Canada chose to decentralize instead of taking a centralist approach, giving the 
provincial governments the fiscal power to meet their needs. The decentralization of taxation 
power meant the federal government had less power to persuade the provinces to act in the 
national interest. Instead, the provinces gained financial power and were able to shape their own 
priorities. The inward looking focus on provincial jurisdiction has meant the provinces largely 
function independently and prioritize their own agendas towards Medicare, which could have 
serious implications for national standards of Medicare.   
The 1970s marked changes in federal transfers in both countries. The federal and 
provincial/state governments agreed to new arrangements in transfers. The Canadian federal 
government feared increasing health-care costs, and the Australian Fraser government preferred 
a limited role of government in areas of social policy. The Trudeau government removed cost-
sharing arrangements for Medicare and established block funding, which included both income 
tax-points and cash grants; the Fraser government in Australia cut SPP for all states, in 
proportion to the value of income tax received by the states. At the federal level, both 
governments attempted to reduce their financial responsibility and maintain a national standard 
of Medicare. Canada accomplished this goal through the block grant and the CHA, and the 
Commonwealth in Australia achieved this goal by retaining fiscal power and assuming major 
controls over health-care jurisdiction.  
Federal grants underwent drastic changes in the 1990s when Canada’s federal 
government unilaterally slashed federal transfers to the provinces while retaining the equal-per-
capita cash and tax-point transfer allocation formula. Australia’s federal government made 
federal transfers more equitable and efficient by instituting full fiscal equalization and 
substantially reducing the number of SPP. The changes in Canada created a highly tense 
relationship between the provinces and the federal government: the provinces formed the 
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Council of the Federation (COF) for solving collective provincial issues without the participation 
of the federal government. Australia moved in the opposite direction and established the COAG 
to address national issues. 
Federal cooperation is necessary in Australia because of government interconnection 
through jurisdictional responsibility. Australian health-care is a shared jurisdiction between the 
two levels of governments with the Commonwealth controlling Medicare services and the states 
controlling community health services. The relationship is not necessarily equal because the 
Commonwealth is able to exert its financial power over the states to achieve its goals, but the 
public pressure to see a uniform and less-confusing health-care system has forced the two 
governments to reduce tension and form mutual agreements. For example, in 2011, the COAG 
signed a health-care partnership with the Commonwealth to improve health outcomes of 
Australians and to reduce waste and confusion within the health-care system (CGC 2015).  
Medicare jurisdiction in Canada is provincial, but the federal government has a 
constitutional and moral obligation to uphold the principles of national Medicare and ensure the 
provinces can provide Canadians with access to Medicare. Policy makers can draw lessons from 
the Australian story to determine if adopting an NBF is practical for Canada. Although changes 
in Australia’s equalization program are the result of institutional decisions—including the High 
Court’s validation of the Uniform Tax Act that solidified the Commonwealth’s dominance over 
tax revenue—the Australian federation was able to adopt and maintain an NBF because the states 
and Commonwealth worked together to meet national objectives through formal institutions. 
Initially, the country focussed on equity in providing public services. The required cooperation 
and trust for achieving this goal came through the CGC whereby non-partisan decisions exist 
based on evidence. Over time, the Commonwealth government sought ways to improve 
efficiency of transfers. It argued that a large number of relativities created confusion and each 
required justification: the relativity had to be policy neutral in order to be included in the 
formula. The Commonwealth Grants Commission then ensured policy neutral relativities for 
equalization entitlements, leading to a more efficient allocation of financial resources.   
Canada’s story of federal transfers demonstrates a diminished role of the federal 
government in preserving Medicare and the increased influence of provincial autonomy over 
health-care. Initially, the federal and provincial governments worked together through cost-
sharing agreements toward a national standard in health-care and social services. However, after 
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the transferring of tax-points to provinces in 1977, the federal government slowly retreated from 
the field of provincial health-care policy. The provinces achieved their goal of autonomy 
gradually, and the federal government withdrew from Medicare policy decision-making, 
culminating in the equal-per-capita cash transfer of 2014. A change to a needs-based approach 
would require a fundamental shift of the federal-provincial relationship away from clear 
divisions of jurisdictional power toward a collaborative partnership. By changing to the needs-
based approach and considering the national interest of Canadian Medicare, the provinces, 
territories, and federal government can fulfil their constitutional roles to ensure access to 
essential Medicare services.  
There are a number of unlikely lessons Canada can draw from Australia, as well as some 
important positive lessons. The most unlikely lesson Canada can draw from Australia is the 
Australian approach to federalism. Canada is a highly regionalized federation whose regions are 
obligated to advance their own interests because of lack of federal institutions to represent a wide 
array of regional and cultural needs. Canada has a multifaceted view of itself as a nation. Quebec 
views Canada as a duality (i.e. two nations together in confederation), while English speaking 
Canada tends to view Canada as a multi-cultural mosaic of many different cultural groups in one 
federation. Australia has a national view of federalism that does not focus on regionalism or 
cultural divides. Australian states are autonomous but they recognize that they represent a more 
homogenous population. In addition, Australian states recognize that the senate and the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission represent state political interests. The senate of Australia is 
comprised of state elected senators that, in theory, represent the interests of the states. The 
Canadian senate is a federally appointed upper chamber, which does not adequately represent 
regional interests. Therefore, regions may feel their political interests are not being heard at the 
national level. The Commonwealth Grants Commission also considers the interests of the states 
when it makes its equalization allocation recommendations. States feel that the Commission 
respects state interests and recommends equalization allocations based on a combination of state 
argument and empirical evidence. Canada does not have an equivalent body, which further 
exacerbates the divide between the regions of Canada and the belief that their interests are not 
being met at the national level.  
Another lesson Canada is unlikely to draw from Australia is the centralized power of 
taxation in the federal government. Australia’s Commonwealth government controls the majority 
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of tax revenue and the majority of expenditure responsibility, whereas the Canadian provinces 
control the majority of tax revenue and expenditure responsibility in Canada. Canada’s provinces 
and territories are unlikely to relinquish power to the federal government because the provinces 
and territories already believe that their interests are not being met at the national level (i.e. lack 
of a regionally representative senate, or an independent body responsible for allocating 
transfers). Without adequate representation and a strong belief that the provinces and territories 
would gain from having the federal government control the majority of taxation power, it is 
unlikely the provinces and territories would be willing to change the current tax structure (Watts 
1999).  
However, despite the near impossibility of changing the state of federalism within 
Canada because of decentralized taxation power and regional divides, Canada can draw from 
Australia the lesson of collaboration because Canadian Medicare is a public program that 
requires federal and provincial cooperation to preserve an integral piece of Canadian citizenship. 
The Romanow Commission articulated that Canadians expect that universal Medicare be 
available and provided to all Canadians regardless of province or territory of residence; 
Canadians also expect their governments, both provincial and federal, to safeguard universal 
Medicare through collaboration. The high value Canadians place on Medicare should spur the 
federal and provincial governments to find ways of preserving the national standard of Medicare 
and a needs-based formula could be a viable policy option. With a firm understanding of the 
definitions, concepts and criteria behind a NBF, Canadian policy makers can then learn from the 
Australian experience to design a desirable and feasible NBF for the CHT.   
One lesson Canadian policy makers may draw from the history of the Australia’s transfer 
system is the use of formalized bodies responsible for federal/provincial transfer arrangements. 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission is an independent organization, using evidence and 
transparent criteria to recommend allocation of equalization in Australia (McLean 2004). The 
Commonwealth respects the CGC and its judgements, and the CGC listens to the concerns of the 
states. The CGC revisits its methodologies every five years and consults with states and other 
stakeholders on potential changes to the formula (CGC 2015). The Commonwealth and states 
occasionally ask the CGC to review its allocation methodologies given certain criteria. The CGC 
listens to the arguments put forward by states and stakeholders and weighs their arguments 
against the principles of full fiscal equalization. States can dispute CGC decisions, but the 
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allocation is a zero-sum game. A body similar to the Commonwealth Grants Commission could 
make decisions on allocating the CHT based on evidence and consistent with the criteria of 
equity and efficiency. An independent body would reduce the political tensions present between 
the federal and provincial governments (Béland and Lecours 2013). In addition, it would 
necessitate the provinces to work with the independent body and the federal government to make 
the most informed policy decisions. If Canada were to create an independent body like the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission, provinces would have a forum to present policy concerns 
with the CHT. An independent body would provide stability to the federal arrangement insofar 
as any changes to the formula would require the input of the provinces and federal government. 
In addition to the benefits of an organization like the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, Canada can draw lessons from the principles of the Council of Australian 
Governments. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is a formal body that allows the 
federal and state governments to unite ideas and combat national issues. Canada does not have an 
equivalent body to COAG. Although premiers casually meet, there is no formal institution 
designed to facilitate collaboration between provincial and federal governments. Creating a 
permanent body similar to COAG would increase the likelihood of an NBF because federal and 
provincial leaders would meet and discuss regularly and collectively make decisions in the 
interest of the country.  
Although it is impossible to replicate the Australian story given the nature of importing 
policies from other countries, Canada could still benefit from having institutions like the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission and the Council of Australian Governments. The presence 
of both bodies reduces political tensions between the two levels of government in the contentious 
zero-sum game of allocation transfers, and allows formal cooperation. Past proposals on 
adopting an independent body like the CGC in Canada focus on amending the Canadian 
equalization system (Béland and Lecours 2013). Equalization is highly contentious in Canada 
and it is unlikely that any meaningful reform to the equalization system will occur in Canada in 
the near future because of the regional divides, as is evident in the O’Brian Commission (Béland 
and Lecours 2013). Regional divides are more noticeable in Canada than Australia, which could 
mean that a change to equalization, without the consent of all the provinces, could create 
political unrest. Provinces believe they are not adequately represented at the federal level and 
therefore have to represent themselves in negotiations with the federal government. Therefore, a 
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change to equalization is not likely to occur if it does not receive support of fiscally stronger 
provinces such as Ontario and Alberta. If the federal government was to adopt full fiscal 
equalization, affluent provinces like Ontario and Alberta may perceive their financial prosperity 
as being arbitrarily taken from them through the ‘equalizing’ process. For example, because 
Alberta’s fiscal capacity is much higher than other provinces, Alberta may not agree with 
equalizing up the fiscal capacity of other provinces based on full fiscal equalization principle, 
which may mean a greater degree of redistribution of tax revenue from Alberta to the other 
provinces. This means it is even more difficult for Alberta to agree with being ‘equalized down’ 
to ensure all provinces are equal in terms of full fiscal capacity (Béland and Lecours 2013).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Medicare funding is one of the major public policies currently being discussed by the provincial 
and federal governments. The CHT shifted to an equal-per capita allocation formula in 2014, it is 
likely that the federal and provincial governments will sign a new health accord in the near 
future. Policy makers can use opportunities to make lasting change to the CHT to ensure a 
minimum national standard in Medicare and uphold a sense of nationhood. Adopting a needs-
based approach is advisable, and this study provides necessary tools to develop a potential needs-
based formula.  
This study first outlines a theoretical framework for the design of a desirable needs-based 
formula. It then draws lessons on the feasibility of an NBF for the CHT through a comparative 
study of the histories of the equalization program in Australia and the CHT in Canada. The 
theoretical framework presented in chapter one and applied in the rest of the chapters shows how 
policy makers can see how the total cost of Medicare relates to population needs, the over-use of 
the system, unmet needs, and input costs. The framework emphasizes the importance of 
understanding need and choosing appropriate need indicators when developing a formula. This 
study also defines the equity and efficiency criteria that policy makers can use to select need 
indicators. The study also reviewed and evaluated the mostly commonly used need indicator 
against the equity and efficiency criteria.  
This study should be helpful to policy makers who want to learn from the experience of 
other countries in their development of an NBF. The comparative study using Australian reveals 
that it is possible to design a needs-based formula if policy makers adhere to the principles of 
equity and efficiency, and agree to uphold the national values about Medicare. If policy makers 
adequately balance equity and efficiency concerns and justify needs indicators in a formula, it is 
likely to succeed. The criteria proposed in the theoretical framework, and the indicators used in 
the Australian Equalization transfer suggest that a potential needs-based formula for CHT could 
include age structure, sex, and geographic dispersion of population. These indicators meet equity 
and efficiency criteria because they indicate need and lead to little perverse incentive. If 
econometric methods and reliable data became available, more need indicators as used in the 
Australian formula (such as wage cost) could also be included in a NBF. However, suggesting 
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what a practical formula would look like for the CHT requires serious empirical investigation 
and is beyond the scope of this study.  
The findings of this study suggest that although it is possible to design an NBF for the 
CHT, a change to NBF is currently unlikely given the institutional setting and the lack of 
collaboration between the two levels of government in the past decades. The comparative study 
also shows that there are several unlikely lessons to be learned from Australia. First, it is unlikely 
that Canada will adopt the Australian view of federalism given Canada’s deep regional divides 
and commitment to furthering regional interests. The Canadian provinces and territories believe 
that their interests are not fully represented at the federal level, partially because Canada does not 
have a formal body like the Australian senate, Commonwealth Grants Commission, or Council 
of Australian Governments. The lack of formal institutions representing the regional interests of 
Canada means the provinces and territories focus on regional rather than national interests. A 
second unlikely lesson is the tax structure of Canada. Canada is unlikely to adopt Australia’s 
federally dominated tax system with the federal government controlling most tax revenue and 
expenditure programs. The provinces and territories are unlikely to yield financial power to the 
federal government because giving power to the federal government could be perceived as 
assuming a subsidiary role in Canadian federalism. In addition, because the provinces and 
territories regard their interests as being unrepresented at the national level, relinquishing tax 
responsibility would only exacerbate the issue.  
Until both levels of governments can see that Medicare is in the national interest and is 
not a simple matter of constitutional jurisdiction, a needs-based approach is unlikely to work in 
the Canadian context. However, if the two levels of government are serious about signing a new 
health accord and making the Canadian Medicare system stronger, then Canadian policy makers 
can use this study to help design a system that promotes the national interest and sustains the 
national standard of Medicare for years to come. To make this happen, Australia provides 
positive lessons for Canada by the Commonwealth Grants Commission and the Council of 
Australian Governments. The CGC is an important part of Australia’s equalization program 
because it provides non-partisan recommendations to the Commonwealth government on how it 
should allocated the GST revenue through equalization. An institution similar to the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission could benefit Canada and provide stability to the CHT in 
the future. A body like the Commonwealth Grants Commission could alleviate tension between 
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governments, but ultimately, Medicare is a joint responsibility, which means the two levels of 
government need to work together to safeguard Canadian Medicare. The principles of COAG 
provide a good lesson from Australia on how to conduct formal discussions on issues of the 
national interest. The Council of Australian Governments establishes formal annual discussions 
between the Commonwealth and state governments as equal partners in solving national public 
policy problems. The equal partnership principle of the Council of Australian Governments 
could allow the provincial, territorial, and federal government to work together towards the 
national interest in Medicare, and a good start would be to agree on a new funding formula for 
the CHT.  
If the strong citizen support for a national standard in Medicare is still in place in Canada, 
the theoretical framework and examples provided in this study could guide the modelling of the 
future empirical studies and lead to a more rigorous debate on the reform of Canada Health 
Transfer. In contrast to a reform to the equalization allocation formula, most provinces are 
willing to discuss changes to the CHT. The 2004 health accord expired in 2014. The provinces 
have called upon the federal government to negotiate a new health accord and to increase CHT 
funding. The Liberal party led by Justin Trudeau committed during the 2015 election to renew 
the health accord and to establish a collaborative relationship with the provinces. The federal and 
provincial governments have an opportunity to make a lasting impact on Medicare by working 
together in the national interest.  
Although the discussions among the federal and provincial/territorial governments have 
yet to begin (scheduled to be in fall of 2016, McGregor  2016), the provinces of Ontario and 
Quebec have called on the federal government to change the CHT formula to a needs-based 
formula that adjusts for demographics (Curry and Van Praet 2015). The framework and 
examples provided in this study will provide policy makers a deeper and broader understanding 
of the reasoning and construct of potential needs-based allocation formula. The federal and 
provincial governments could consider the implications of developing a needs-based formula for 
the Canada Health Transfer, by looking at how equitable and efficiency a new distribution is, 
how a distribution will affect each province, and how a needs-based formula will benefit the 
country and safeguard the national interest of Medicare.  
Despite these interesting findings, this study has a number of limitations. First, the 
theoretical framework provides a summary of the essential conditions for a needs-based formula. 
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Policy makers can use this tool to consider various need indicators and factors for a needs-based 
formula. However, developing an actual mathematical formula requires serious econometric 
analyses of Canadian data. For example, the theoretical framework may suggest that age is a 
need indicator that is both equitable and efficient, but the framework does not specify how to 
create a mathematical formula using statistical data about age.  Further technical work is required 
in order to make the proposed theoretical framework practical.  Second, the study focussed only 
on one federal country in its comparison with Canada. Expanding comparison to other federal 
countries could improve the scope and depth of lesson drawing. Another limitation was in the 
method of this study. Due to the constraint of time and resources, this study is limited to analysis 
of documents and statistics. The breadth of this study could have improved by including 
interviews with Canadian and Australian federal transfer experts and bureaucrats. Finally, the 
study was limited to examining the CHT when a more comprehensive study of the entire federal 
transfer system in both Canada and Australia could have resulted in a more thorough analysis.  
This study has the potential to influence public debate on the desirability and feasibility 
of a needs-based formula for federal transfers. Researchers may be interested in expanding this 
study to other countries to establish a comprehensive understanding of why countries adopt 
various needs-based formulas. Focus could also expand to the Canada Social Transfer or to 
Equalization to see if these transfers could follow a needs-based approach.  
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